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ABSTRACT 
Sport venues for professional teams in North America have drawn substantial attention from 
academicians, elected officials, and taxpayers across more than 50 years. That focus is a result of 
the cultural significance of sport and the magnitude of the public sector’s investment in the venues 
used by professional sport franchises since the 1950s. Franchise owners have a clear interest in 
securing subsidies for venues that offer enhanced amenities that produce new and more revenue 
streams. In the absence of public sector investment, a new or renovated arena, ballpark, or stadium 
would cost an owner more money. With regard to the public sector’s interests in these investments 
and venues, several unresolved questions frame the political discourse that defined this 
dissertation.  
The primary purpose of this three-paper dissertation is to study the economics of venue 
investment and development and broaden the current literature on stadium finance and public 
policy. Each of the three studies provide new insights related to existing theory, confirm previously 
proposed arguments, and propose new methods to examine the finances of professional sport 
venues. The first study is a spatial analysis of the distribution of professional sport franchises in 
the United States, critically examining the impact of the monopolies on the geographical 
distribution. The second study analyzes attendance in English soccer, particularly the duration of 
the statistical association between increased attendance and new stadiums. The final study 
examines public policy, public finance and urban planning theories associated with sport venue 
finance and development. The methodologies include quantitative analyses using instrumental-
variable models with data for five census periods, panel ordinary least squared and Tobit models 
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using attendance and club level fixed and random effects, and an extensive survey of existing 
literature and categorization.    
Based on the quantitative and qualitative analyses in my research – which enhances previous 
descriptive assessments of the existence of cartel control – I conclude and corroborate important 
evidence of anti-market behavior. The models presented detail the monopolistic structure of the 
North American professional sport leagues and their policies significantly affects where franchises 
are located. The leagues’ actions create the market-failure that leads to the provision of public 
subsidies to attract and retain teams. It is apparent that markets robust enough to support a franchise 
do not have one in a concerted effort to ensure that franchises receive subsidies. Such markets 
without franchises have been used as leverage by franchise owners to obtain public incentives. 
Because of the monopolies, it also appears that the long-term effect of new facilities on attendance 
and economic activity is different compared to levels in English soccer that includes promotion 
and relegation. The duration of the association between the new stadiums and attendance was 
significantly longer in English soccer than the “honeymoon” in North American sports. As I 
revealed in the third study in the dissertation, despite the criticism against the allocation of public 
resources and incentives, since 2010 the public sector provided more than five billion USD to 
support the development of professional sport venues. Public incentives are unlikely to change; 
therefore, I propose that the analysis of sport related projects should focus on more recent urban 
development and governance theories as opposed to neoclassical public finance ones. 
There are several future research possibilities stemmed from my studies, including analyzing 
the spatial distribution of professional sports with data that includes economic variables such as 
firms, and evaluating the optimal number of franchises and their locations. Additional studies 
should examine attendance trends and their association with new stadiums in other leagues outside 
xi 
 
of North American, offering additional perspectives on the behavior within different leagues that 
include promotion and relegation. Finally, I propose that future studies should examine the 
development and finance of sport facilities with a more extensive analysis of urban studies theories 
including urban entrepreneurialism, municipal capitalism, and performance and conformance. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
“If you build it [they] he will come”  
(Field of Dreams, 1989 film) 
 
Sport venues for professional teams in North America have drawn substantial attention from 
academicians (particularly since Noll’s seminal study in 1974), elected officials, and taxpayers 
across the 70 years of investments by state and local governments in the venues used by 
professional teams. This interest is a function of the cultural significance of sport and the control 
of the supply of teams by the major sport leagues despite increasing demand from the residents of 
regions without teams. Team owners have a clear monetary interest in securing a subsidy for a 
venue that offers more revenue streams. In the absence of a public sector investment, it would cost 
an owner more for the venue. With regard to the public sector’s interests, several unresolved 
questions frame the political discourse, some of which may never be fully resolved, bar any 
controversial circumstances revealing new truths. Among those that scholars frequently ask are:  
• Is there any justification for any public sector investment in a sport venue used by privately 
owned teams?  
• Do facilities used by privately owned professional teams contribute to a region’s package 
of amenities or its publicly proclaimed policy objectives? Would either benefit justify the 
public sector’s investment in the venue? If there are public benefits, does that mean venues 
can be considered public or merit goods?  
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• What are the positive spatial effects from a venue and a team’s presence in a particular city, 
and what is their net value? 
• Should sport venue assets be treated similarly to any other recreational facility such 
museums and libraries?  
• Finally, the US government already offered all sport leagues exemptions from anti-trust 
laws and Canadian laws has territorial exclusivity clauses in the NHL by-laws. These 
protections permit the leagues to restrict the supply of franchises and set prices independent 
of the fear of competition (from other sport leagues). Should the public sector offer 
additional subsidies too? 
The three studies that comprise this dissertation offer unique insights into subjects that 
while part of a robust literature, could benefit from the approaches and perspectives that define 
this dissertation. The first paper assesses the impact of the cartel-status and under-supply of the 
professional leagues on regions in the United States from an economic geography perspective. 
There is a unique effort to provide a quantitative measurement of the extent to which anti-market 
or anti-competitive activity exists. This paper offers an analysis using Geographical Information 
Systems (GIS) and statistics. The second paper assess the effect of new venues in an open league 
structure. Studies of this topic focused primarily on North American leagues where relegation is 
not a relevant factor. The third paper returns to the basic issue of public investments in sport venues 
by presenting a framework that may offer a framework that is more useful than public goods theory 
in explaining the observed interest of governments to invest in these assets.  
These papers address voids in the literature also strive to serve elected officials and 
taxpayers given (1) the sustained interest of cities in hosting teams and (2) owners’ need or 
preference for new venues with the ability to tap into emerging revenue streams.  Since 2010, I 
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estimate that the public sector’s investment in sport venues exceeded six billion dollars. This 
insatiable appetite suggests different perspectives on what can be described as “the stadium mess” 
is of value to social scientists, taxpayers, and public officials. The overarching theme of this 
dissertation is the debate on publicly financed sport facilities anchored in Roger Noll’s (1974) 
seminal study. Each of the studies provides a different perspective on sport venue finance and 
economics (Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1-1: Dissertation structure and research paper general topics and theories 
   
1.1 Research questions 
Each of the papers answer different research questions consistently discussing questions related to 
public policy issues and the value of sport facilities to the public and private sectors. The three 
primary questions are as follows: 
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Paper 1: How does the cartel structure of North American Leagues (MLB, NFL, NHL, and NBA) 
affect the geographical distribution of professional sport franchises in the United States? 
Hypothesis 1: Spatial analysis of professional sports reveals that markets that appear to have the 
characteristics of an adequate sport market accentuate the North American monopolistic structure. 
Paper 2: How does the association between new stadiums and attendance differ between the cartel 
North American leagues and the English open-league system? 
Hypothesis 2: The duration of the statistical association between increased attendance at sporting 
events and new facilities in a league with promotion and relegation is longer than the association 
in the North American closed leagues and the “honeymoon effect”. 
Paper 3: What role do municipal capitalism and urban entrepreneurialism play in the continuous 
allocation of public resources for privately used sport facilities? 
Hypothesis 3: Municipal capitalism and urban entrepreneurialism are more adequate theories than 
public goods theory and the provision of merit goods to examine why and how cities invest in 
professional sport venues, and if the outcomes meet the expectations.  
In the first paper, I model the relationship between the three primary agents in the North 
American sport development and public finance discussion. The agents are the leagues, the 
franchises that play in the leagues, and the public sector. My three papers address this relationship, 
each discussing one or more of the agents, and the relationships between them. My dissertation’s 
conceptual model (Figure 1.2) is an extension of the model in the first paper. The model describes 
the relationship between the three primary actors, the leagues, the franchises, and the public sector, 
and depicts how each of the studies discuss the components that formulate this “pyramid”. The 
leagues are at the top of the original pyramid, controlling the number of franchises and franchise 
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locations. The leagues have a strong relationship with individual owners that collectively and 
individually are integral decision-makers. However, franchise owners cannot relocate to different 
markets without the consent of the league and other franchise owners. The public sector’s control 
often depends on their willingness and ability to use public incentives to attract or maintain a 
franchise, but the locational decision-making is ultimately in the hands of the leagues and the other 
owners.  
Figure 1-2: Conceptual model 
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1.2 Theoretical background 
My three studies contribute to existing research in sport venue development finance, public sector 
economics, and public policy. The theoretical background overlaps in all three studies but each 
focuses on specific theoretical features. Generally, the studies relate to the initial examination of 
sport venue finances, particularly, since public incentives and financial contributions became more 
apparent in the latter half of the 20th century (Noll, 1974). Since the Braves moved to Milwaukee 
and the St. Louis Browns relocated to Baltimore in the 1950s, public costs and incentives are 
common practice in sport venue finance (Johnson, 1983; Eisen, 1987). Four leagues, Major League 
Baseball (MLB), National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL), and 
National Hockey League (NHL) dominate North American professional sport. There is also a 
growing interest in Major League Soccer (MLS). North American leagues are closed-leagues that 
new franchises can only join through expansion and the permission of the leagues (Noll, 2003; 
Szymanski, 2003). Franchises pursuing relocation are also required to have the league’s 
permission to do so with the permission of a majority of other franchise owners (Ross, 2003). The 
cartel structure of these leagues is arguably the fundamental reason why public officials use 
resources s to attract or maintain a franchise (Rosentraub, 1999).  
 Franchise owners can use the threat to relocate or offer to relocate to a new market to obtain 
public incentives or financial resources to build lucrative sport venues or other facilities such as 
baseball’s spring training (Mills, Rosentraub & Jakar, 2019). Owners rely on the unwillingness of 
some public officials to be recorded as ones that “lost” a franchise (Baade & Dye, 1988a). The 
increased public involvement in facility finance required public officials to initiate finance 
mechanisms to support bond sales and other resources that are divided between local resources 
and exported costs (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000; Crompton, Howard & Var 2003). Several of the 
7 
 
taxation methods relied on tourism fees, or alcohol and tobacco that generate less opposition from 
residents (Buist & Mason, 2010). Public finance proponents commonly justify these new taxes by 
arguing that the benefits of having a new facility for a retained or new professional franchise 
compensate for the costs (Kellison & Mondello, 2014).  
 Critics often focus on the contested new economic impact a franchise and new facility can 
have on a city (Baade, 1996, Rosentraub, 1999). It is essential of course to distinguish between the 
franchise and facility although they are interconnected, just as plants are interconnected with the 
manufacturers using them. A facility can exist without a franchise, but a franchise will not exist 
without a facility. Both have different potential impacts (Coates & Humphreys, 1999). This 
distinction is noted in the examination of the produced public goods associated with the franchise 
rather than the facility (Johnson & Whitehead, 2007). Making the distinction between the facility 
and franchise is of course important when debating the construction of a new facility to retain an 
existing franchise or building one for an expansion franchise. In the case of a franchise relocating 
within a city or region, the impact focuses on the new facility on property values (Ahlfeldt & 
Maennig, 2009; Feng & Humphreys, 2012). If a franchise relocates to a new market then the 
impact included is the value of a venue and having a franchise (Mason & Slack, 1996). If that 
occurs, the new tangible and intangible benefits can be analyzed (Wicker, Hallmann, Breuer & 
Feiler, 2012). The intangible benefits are often insufficient or less than the costs of the sport venue 
to the public sector (Baade & Dye, 1988b). However, those findings remain inconclusive, 
particularly because of the intricacies of quantifying and determining the intangible benefits. 
Rosentraub, Swindell & Tsvetkova (2008), illustrate that the intangible benefits can exceed the 
cost of a venue to the public sector. However, some studies note other benefits at play that can at 
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the least “make the most of the situation”, by relocating economic activity within a region and if 
successful, attract extensive private investment (Rosentraub, 2006). 
 Sport, and similar assets (convention centers and museums) can exclude non-payers and 
are thus share more characteristics with other private goods than traditional local public goods 
(e.g., education, public transportation, etc.). Do the private goods aspects of sport make a public 
investment in a venue inappropriate (Skinner, Ekelund & Jackson, 2009)? The economics of such 
activities such as sport and tourism infrastructure require a critical perspective on the public 
sector’s role in modern economic and urban development (Bodlender, 1982; Mules, & Dwyer, 
2005; Solberg & Preuss, 2007). Since local governments compete for human capital and economic 
activity, they are no longer just service providers but need to adopt business-like management 
strategies and become far more entrepreneurial (Harvey, 1989). Arguably, this is part of the reason 
why cities compete to host large sporting events (Baade & Matheson, 2016; Zimbalist, 2016), 
invest in museums, convention centers and tourism (Sanders, 1992 & 2002; Plaza, 2000)), and 
possibly why some public officials strive to maintain sport franchises. Each of these examples are 
studied, focusing particularly on their economic and social impact, and whether these impacts 
justify the allocated public resources (Hiller, 2006; Mills & Rosentraub, 2013). One clear 
difference between professional sport and other projects is that the economics of professional 
sport, its cartel-like status, and the scale of the resulting revenue streams. In my three studies, I 
analyze the monopolization of North American professional sport, the relationship between new 
stadiums and attendance in an open-league system, and I propose a theory that identifies why 
public officials continue to allocate public resources for heavily scrutinized projects.    
.    
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1.3 Methodologies 
The first two studies include quantitative analyses. My empirical analysis in the third study is an 
extensive review and text analysis of previous studies and empirical data on recent sport venue 
projects in North America. The geographical analysis in the first paper uses an instrumental-
variable regression examining metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) and counties for five census 
periods (1970-2010) in the United States. The spatial analysis examined the demographic 
centrality of counties within MSAs and the probabilities of having a franchise based on market 
characteristics, the MSAs, and regions. I conducted post estimate analyses to predict the 
probability of a county having a franchise compared with the actual presence of a franchise 
(specificity and sensitivity). The attendance model for English soccer used a difference-in-
difference model in both ordinary least squares and Tobit models. I examined the duration of the 
association between attendance and new stadiums using an interaction variable between the age of 
the new stadiums and their capacity. I tested the statistical significance of these interactions and 
used GIS to determine the statistical region for each club (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for 
Statistics - NUTS3) in order to collect population and discretionary income. I collected club related 
data from annual financial accounts published by English soccer clubs. In the final paper, I 
examine a hundred and sixteen studies that discussed sport venue finance. I analyzed and grouped 
the studies based on different categories. This study also included data collected on the financing 
sources for professional sport venues built since 2010 in the United States and Canada. I briefly 
review three of the recent projects based on the categories identified in previous studies.   
10 
 
1.4 Synopsis of the three papers 
1.4.1 Paper 1: The economic geography of monopolized professional sport  
Several studies descriptively analyzed the effects of the monopolized North American professional 
sport leagues. A few of these studies noted the size of the markets where franchises are located 
and the existence of similarly markets without franchises. My first study examined the economic 
geography with a more analytical approach strengthening the arguments that the monopolistic 
behavior of the four major sport leagues not only prevents franchises from moving to more 
appealing economically and demographically markets but also deprives those regions of teams. 
The instrumental-variable statistical analysis of franchise locations, a far more sophisticated 
approach to quantify cartel domination, and 1970-2010 census data reveals that in each period 
markets existed without franchises despite the analysis predicting otherwise.  In addition, some 
markets had franchises despite the analysis predicting otherwise. The implications of these 
findings reflect on the locational control of professional sport and the ability to use potential 
relocation to secure public incentives for new sport venues.  
1.4.2 Paper 2: Attendance and new stadiums in English soccer 
This study provides another account on the implications of the monopolized structure of North 
American professional sport and stadium economics by comparing previous attendance studies in 
North American and English soccer new sport venues. The fixed-effect ordinary least squared and 
Tobit analyses of average attendance during the 1997-2016 seasons in the top four divisions of 
English soccer revealed that the duration of the association between new stadiums and attendance 
is closer to twenty years as opposed to the below ten years estimated in North American studies. 
English soccer, as opposed to the North American leagues, has a promotion and relegation system. 
The study sheds light on the likelihood that the closed league system is associated with the shorter 
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duration of the association between new venues and attendance. This strengthens the arguments 
that as long as the North American professional sport monopolies exist, increased attendance at 
new facilities insufficiently justifies public incentives as the economic activity of increased 
attendance depends on other factors controlled by the leagues and franchise and not the public 
sector.  
1.4.3 Paper 3: Theoretical perspectives on publicly finance facilities 
This qualitative analysis of previous studies and theoretical public and urban finance principles 
proposes that future examination of public involvement in sport venue finance should focus on 
recent on municipal capitalism and urban entrepreneurialism rather than public goods. Municipal 
capitalism and urban entrepreneurialism theories deliberate the public sector’s role in the modern 
era’s competition for human capital for economic development. In addition to providing services, 
cities are now more engaged in development initiatives and partnerships with the private sector in 
order to attract human capital and additional investment in the city. Classical theories and 
approaches do not justify the public’s involvement in a monopolized industry. The on-going 
allocation of public resources to attract or retain sport franchise underscores the limitation in that 
approach. I recommend considering a different theoretical approach that could better frame what 
is taking place. I propose that future studies should analyze the sport venue projects as a public 
“private-like” investment rather than public goods.     
1.5 Structure and summary 
The purpose of this dissertation was to contribute to sport management and urban studies, focusing 
particularly on sport venue development and sport economics by writing three studies that I will 
submit to peer reviewed journals. My concluding remarks following the presentation of the three 
12 
 
studies summarizes the findings and conclusions from the three studies and includes my 
overarching conclusions on sport venue development and finance, and future studies. 
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 Cartels and the Artificial Scarcity of Professional Sport 
Franchises: A Spatial Analysis 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Despite the growing economy and population in the United States since the 1970s, North American 
professional leagues limited the expansion to very few new franchises. Arguably, the monopolistic 
characteristics of professional sport enable franchises to use relocation threats to secure public 
incentives. However, franchises would need potential markets without franchises where they could 
potentially relocate. I use an instrumental-variable two-stage probit analysis and 1970-2010 county 
census data to measure the probability of a county hosting a professional franchise to identify if 
potential markets exist. Previous assessments of market viability relied on important population 
growth. The more sophisticated approach in the model considers the relative location and 
population of a county within MSAs as a geographical indicator and other variables.  I produce a 
cluster robust estimator of the variance for the county’s MSA. The findings illustrate that there are 
in fact potential markets without franchises that existing franchises can use as leverage. This more 
robust approach validates the descriptive approaches that illustrated the monopolistic control of 
the markets for professional sport franchises. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The location of professional sport franchises has changed in response to the shifting economic 
geography of United States. Professional sport was once concentrated in the Northeast and 
Midwest. Since the 1950s, however, league expansions and teams mainly relocated to serve 
markets in the West and South in response to new economic and demographic patterns (Molloy, 
Smith, & Wozniak 2011). Numerous franchises remained in once prospering cities in the Midwest 
and Northeast that suffered extensive job losses and a fleeing middle class after World War II. 
However, in several instances those franchises moved from central to suburban cities. These 
relocations were part of the suburbanization process that reshaped the urban geography of North 
American (Margo, 1992). Increased population and economic activity outside of the core cities 
created new potential markets for businesses and sport franchises within their existing 
metropolitan areas. Consequently, franchises like other businesses relocated to counties within 
their home regions preserving their existing fan base while playing in a new facility more 
conveniently located within the more affluent communities.    
Figure 1 displays the location of the 71 franchises in the United States playing in the four 
major leagues (National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL), Major 
League Baseball (MLB) and the National Hockey League (NHL) in 1970 and the 110 franchises 
playing in 2010. The Northeast and Midwest still dominate in the 21st century despite the 
population and economic decline of some of the larger cities in the Midwest. Figure 1 displays the 
more dispersed distribution in 2010 though still widely excluding large parts in the center. Leagues 
were expanding and some franchises relocated to new markets or followed suburbanization 
patterns. 
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Figure 2-1: Location of North American sport NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB franchises (1970 
& 2010)  
 
 
In some instances, franchises moved to nearby counties to play in a new facility in a 
suburban city but remained close enough to their previous site to leave their fan base largely 
unchanged. The most recent example was the relocation of the Atlanta Braves (MLB) from Atlanta 
(Fulton County) to suburban Cobb County. Relocating within the metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) maintained their existing market while benefiting from the incentives provided by Cobb 
County. The league must approve every move of a franchise, even those within a region. Those 
within a region are rarely if ever denied.  However, relocations to new markets, if approved, usually 
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require a relocation fee to offset the foregone income earned by selling a new franchise to a new 
owner. Simply put, the leagues’ control of relocations and expansions, capitalizes on the closed-
league structure and monopolistic markets (Beisner, 1988; Quirk and Fort, 2010).  
A benefit of limiting the number of franchises permits the use of other viable markets as 
leverage points when bargaining for public incentives despite the political and public relations 
associated with a relocation. Host cities, however, often do not want to risk the loss of a team. 
These factors prompted studies focused on population size to illustrate the monopolistic behavior 
and bargaining or game theory positions of the leagues. This paper extends that work through an 
economic geography perspective analyzing franchise locations and markets in North America. 
This spatial analysis takes into consideration the relevancy of both the larger markets (MSAs) and 
the local market (counties) based on 1970-2010 census data. The models illustrate the potential 
markets within the MSAs where teams played and the other regions that could support teams in 
each of the five periods studied. The availability of potential and competing markets empowers 
businesses seeking financial incentives to minimize their operating and capital costs (Zheng and 
Warner, 2010). This appears to be the case for professional sport franchises in the United States 
that secure monetary and property incentives during negotiations for new facilities. The current 
circumstances and lack of competition are beneficial for franchises in smaller or economically 
weaker markets, and are arguably the main reason why some survive in certain markets. As long 
as franchises were able to secure public incentives and had some additional monetary support from 
the leagues, franchises were less reliant on the local markets but could also relocate within the 
market to areas that are more affluent. If the leagues retain anti-market (Kennedy and Rosentraub, 
2000) power then it is unlikely that the perverse funding schemes for venues will abate. I validate 
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past research that portrayed a descriptive analysis of potential markets with a more statistical 
model. 
I base my analysis on an instrumental-variable probit model using decennial data from the 
US Bureau of the Census for 1970 through 2010 for 84 MSAs and 502 counties. The location of 
each franchise and any changes in the location of its home field form part of the database. The 
two-stage model includes a county centrality factor that measures the population size and distance 
relative to other counties in the MSA and the MSA’s total population. I also use MSAs to determine 
cluster robust standard errors. The centrality factor is treated as the exogenous variable resolving 
the possible but unlikely endogeneity between franchise location and population (i.e. that 
franchises cause population growth in some counties). The analysis specifically focuses on 
counties rather than MSAs because MSAs can have multiple counties with franchises. In addition, 
franchises can move between counties within a MSA to compensate for urban geographical shifts, 
and the importance of a concentrated local market as opposed to a more dispersed MSA. Following 
the introduction, section II presents a brief literature review of North American economic 
geography, firm locational decision-making, and sport and geography. Section III is an overview 
of the geography of North American professional sport. Section IV describes the methodology and 
the descriptive statistics. Section V discusses the regression model results. The implications of the 
data are discussed in section VI followed by the conclusions.     
 
2.2 Literature review: North American economic geography and the geography of sport 
Since the 1950s the United States’ economic geography and economic activity spread south and 
west; within most areas there was also a high degree of decentralization. These changes coincided 
with the US increasing scale of a service-dominated economy and higher degrees of urbanization 
21 
 
(Sassen, 1990; Desmet and Fafchamps, 2005; Drucker, 2011). Counties as well as states and MSAs 
were being affected by the increase in service-based jobs and the declining importance of the 
manufacturing sector. In addition, there was an increasing concentration of lower income 
households in central cities as wealthier ones chose a more suburbanized lifestyle (Levernier, 
Partridge, and Rickman, 1998). As a result, the historic central cities had to compete with the land-
abundant suburbs that were luring jobs away from the city (Burns, 1977; Scott, 1982). These 
stresses dominated in cities in the region described as the rust belt as there was also a relocation 
of people to southern and western states (Wilson and Wouters, 2003). Those cities that experienced 
job losses relied on supply-side techniques such as tax incentives to encourage business 
development in an era when businesses were moving away (Reese, 1992). North American cities 
and states were using tax incentives to lure surviving manufacturing firms from other states and 
cities (Lee, 2008). Several studies examined market and firm characteristics, as well as the impact 
of local incentives and taxation on locational decision-making (Arauzo‐Carod, Liviano‐Solis, and 
Manjón‐Antolín, 2010). Tax incentives, however, often fail to achieve their initial goals and 
evidence suggests that specific interest groups were the beneficiaries of these subsidies (Buss, 
2001). This research did not dissuade cities from using tax and other incentives to lure or maintain 
sport franchises (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
Several studies discussed the monopolistic characteristics of professional sport in North 
America and stadium finance (Coates and Humphreys, 2008). The majority of these concluded 
that the costs of facilities outweighed the tangible regional benefits (Lertwachara and Cochran, 
2007; Baade, Baumann and Matheson, 2008). Why then did regions offer subsidies or incentives 
to attract or retain a team? The cartel-like structure of the four leagues protected by Congressional 
actions and decisions permitted the use of anti-market activities.  Those tactics allowed teams and 
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the leagues to negotiate deals that ensured the public sector’s investment in venues.  In some 
instances, governments paid for the entire cost of a venue; in other situations, the government paid 
for part of the capital or operating costs (or both) of the desired venues.  The incentives were not 
limited to offsets for capital and operating costs.  The public sector also helped secure the needed 
land and provided property tax abatements (Baade and Matheson, 2006). Most studies on stadia 
finance focused on case studies or specific leagues as opposed to a more collective study of North 
American professional sport. To illustrate the uneven bargaining dynamic between the public 
sector and teams/leagues Quirk (1973), Zimbalist (1992), Quirk and Fort (1997), and Rosentraub 
(1997) looked at the population needed for a market to support a team and/or the distribution of 
playing talent. These works compared selected market characteristics, including population, to 
markets with teams and those without. These descriptive analyses presented the argument that the 
number of franchises and metropolitan populations were intentionally unbalanced to empower the 
leagues and franchises (Rosentraub, 1997, P. 76-79). I advance this argument – the scarcity of 
franchises - using a statistical analysis that takes into consideration various market conditions 
including income and the relative population and distance from other counties in the metropolitan 
area. Previous studies used these market characteristics, examining locational decision-making and 
their association with attendance as a profitability indicator (Jones and Ferguson, 1988). The study 
used population and income to examine locational factors in relation to attendance and 
profitability. This study contributes to existing literature on monopolistic control from an 
economic geography perspective. I also provide another example on the utilization of economic 
geography theories in locational decision-making and different industries.  
The leagues and owners pursuing better markets, and the individual and league-wide benefits 
for enhancing profits determine North American sport franchise relocations and league 
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expansions. Strengthening the league’s monopolistic control also makes it more difficult for 
competing leagues to form (Quirk, 1973). The geographic perspective of space and place that 
examines market shifts and relocations is important but insufficiently discussed in the literature 
(Bale, 1981; Bale, 2002; Higham and Hinch, 2006). Some geographical studies exist including an 
earlier study of potential locations in the English soccer league (Rivett, 1975) and spatial 
competition in sport and the impact on relocation (Henrickson, 2012). However, very few studies 
explicitly use geographical space and place analyses to study the geographical distribution of 
professional sports. Some geographical measures are used in sport studies such as the use of local 
demographic and economic characteristics to study local and regional effects of sport development 
(i.e. Walker, 1985; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2006; Feng and Humphreys, 2018) or the use of 
distance in attendance studies (Borland and Macdonald, 2003). Hence, sport related studies do not 
ignore geographical elements, but a more explicit geographical approach can broaden the 
examination of space and place in sport and the analyses of markets, locations, and policies (Wise, 
2015). My research contributes to the explicitly understudied group of geographical analyses 
examining locational dynamics of sports relocation and movement (Bale, 1988).  This also 
amplifies previous work that focused on demonstrating that the leagues have artificially 
constrained the growth of teams. 
 
2.3 The Geography and locational distribution of North American Professional sport 
Franchises often use relocation prospects during stadium finance negotiations (Noll and Zimbalist, 
1997). Relocation can occur between counties within MSAs or franchises moving to new MSAs 
in different states (Table 1). The purpose of the table is to provide a clear relocation and expansion 
pattern throughout the United States during the 1970-2010 period. During the 1970-2010 period, 
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there were 21 instances where franchises relocated between counties within the same MSA. Table 
1 displays franchise mobility on a county level data for the 502 counties in the 84 MSAs identified 
in the data collection process including counties and MSAs with, and those without, franchises. 
The table indicates if franchises remained in the county or relocated to a different city within the 
MSA; if the county was located in an MSA with a franchise but the county itself did not have a 
franchise; or if the county was located in an MSA without a franchise in two adjacent periods (i.e. 
did not have one in 1970 or 1980). Several counties and MSAs did not have a franchise throughout 
the five census periods. MLB franchises rarely relocated since the 1970s following the relocation 
of a number of clubs in the 1950s and 1960s. Mobility was more apparent in other leagues but the 
majority of the MSAs and most counties with franchises maintained their status.   
Table 2-1: Franchise movement in the 502 counties and MSAs included in the data between 
1970 and 2010 
NFL NHL 
 Status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1970-1980 21 4 1 4 216 3 3 8 243 1970-1980 9  1 1 104 9 5 56 318 
1980-1990 25 2   216 10 2 9 236 1980-1990 12  3 1 129 27 1 3 324 
1990-2000 24 2 2 3 215 11 3 26 217 1990-2000 11 1 2 2 116 15 9 65 282 
2000-2010 27 3  3 240  1 7 222 2000-2010 20 1 1 1 162 19 2 17 280 
 
MLB NBA 
 Status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1970-1980 20 2  1 196  2 15 267 1970-1980 11 1 1 2 113 12 9 79 275 
1980-1990 22   1 210    267 1980-1990 19 1 2 1 179 10 6 36 246 
1990-2000 22 1  1 212  4 12 251 1990-2000 24 2  2 215   2 258 
2000-2010 26 1  2 223    251 2000-2010 25  1  215 4 3 16 239 
 
All counties (with one or more franchises) Summary of the four leagues 
 Status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1970-1980 29 1 1 9 218 3 7 25 210 1970-1980 61 7 3 8 629 24 19 158 1103 
1980-1990 42 1 1 2 239 1 4 15 195 1980-1990 78 3 5 3 734 47 9 48 1073 
1990-2000 45 2 1 4 251 3 3 15 179 1990-2000 81 6 4 8 758 26 16 105 1008 
2000-2010 50 2  2 266  3 14 166 2000-2010 98 5 2 6 840 23 6 40 992 
Status Index:                     
1. County: The county had a franchise in both periods 
2. County: The county had a franchise that moved to another county in the same MSA 
3. County: County had a franchise but then the franchise left the county and MSA 
4. MSA: Franchise was in a county in the same MSA and then moved to the given county 
5. MSA: Franchise was in a different county in the same MSA and remained in the MSA and not in the county 
6. MSA: The MSA where the county was located had a franchise that then left the MSA 
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7. Neither: There was not a franchise in the county or MSA that then moved to the county 
8. Neither: There was not a franchise in the county or MSA but then a franchise located in the MSA 
9. Neither: Neither the county or MSA had a franchise in each period 
 
During the 2000-2010 period, there were few relocations. The data in Table 1 does not 
capture the few cases where a franchise left a county between two periods and a new franchise 
from the same league located in the same county or market within the same period (i.e. Cleveland). 
The NHL differs from the other leagues because of the number of franchises playing in Canada 
that are not included in this study. The relocation of two NHL franchises to Canada from Atlanta 
(Atlanta Flames were there from 1972 to 1980 and Atlanta Thrashers from 1999-2011) influence 
the MSA figures in Table 1 for the NHL. 
There is arguably no reason why, if franchises were free to relocate, that they should not 
move to new markets as do other businesses. However, under the current cartel-like operational 
status of the leagues, movements occur if desired by an owner while also satisfying the league’s 
interests. The decision-making process to relocate a franchise involves three primary actors. In 
Figure 2, I depict the relationship between these primary actors: the leagues, the franchises, and 
the public sector. The relationships in this triangle emphasize the limitations placed on relocation 
by leagues and other franchise owners, and the predicaments that cities face with a relocation threat 
(Johnson, 1983). The solid arrows in Figure 2 display the general relationship between the three 
parties. The thicker solid arrow represents the stronger relationship between the leagues and 
franchise owners and the reduced impact or importance of the public sector. The public sector has 
some influence as long as franchises pursue public incentives, but cities face two possibilities. 
They either provide some incentives or remain without a franchise. The main issue is that cities 
are not often aware if the franchises can in fact execute the relocation threat (Rosentraub and 
Swindell, 2002). 
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Figure 2-2: Relationship between leagues, franchises and the public sector  
 
 
The dashed lines emphasize the leagues and franchise ownerships influential abilities to use current 
market conditions when bargaining with the public sector. The one-way arrows emphasize that the 
apparent symmetry is broken by the one-way arrows leading to (but not away from) the public 
sector. Under current circumstances the public sector’s ability to attract a franchise, if applicable, 
relies primarily on two possibilities: 1) an untapped market that appeals to owners, e.g. Los 
Angeles (NFL most recently) and Las Vegas (NHL and the NFL most recently). 2) The public 
sector approves a financing/property allocation incentive that appeals to franchises (for example, 
Cobb County’s incentives that convinced the Atlanta Braves to move away from downtown 
Atlanta). In some cases, such as the upcoming relocation of the Oakland Raiders to Las Vegas, the 
interests of the team and league have been satisfied. The Raiders will enjoy the revenues from a 
new domed stadium and the league has a team in a growing tourist destination. In addition, the 
Greater San Francisco/Oakland region are sufficiently large enough to support a second NFL 
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franchise. The existence of a vacant market spot makes it easier for other franchises to threaten to 
relocate in an effort to secure additional financial assistance from their home local governments 
who might fear the loss of the team.  
2.4 Methodology and data 
The first step of the research was to identify the MSAs and counties included in the analysis. 
Because of the extended period and use of census data, MSA and census tract geographical 
definitions are inconsistent. This study, therefore, uses county level statistical areas and census 
data collected for counties that were fairly consistent. Because MSAs change, I used the 2000 
census definition to match counties and MSAs for the five periods. I describe the identification of 
the relevant MSAs and counties in Figure 3. The first step was to identify the MSAs where 
franchises were located and their population. The second step was identifying other MSAs without 
franchises that had a population similar or greater than the average of the five smallest MSAs with 
franchises. The purpose of this step was to identify “potential” markets without franchises. The 
third step identifies each county in the MSAs from steps one and two. The fourth step was the 
creation of a unified list of counties for the five census periods in order to create a longitudinal 
data series for each county.    
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Figure 2-3: MSA and county identification process  
 
Census data has limitations, particularly longitudinal data, because geographical 
definitions change as has the data collection methods and questions. Because MSA definitions also 
change, I selected the 2000 census MSA borders to aggregate data based on county level data for 
each decennial period. By doing so, I created a more consistent data set based on the counties that 
were within the 2000 MSA borders. I based the actual MSAs included in the data on the 2010 
MSAs because the dataset considers the most recent franchise locations. I identified 84 MSAs 
throughout the United States (I do not include Alaska and Hawaii in the analysis because distances 
and population sizes make each unlikely destinations for a franchise) based on the average of the 
five smallest MSAs with franchises and the “potential” markets. I collected the counties that are 
the actual observations by using GIS (Geographical Information System) and the 2000 Census 
County and MSA borders for the 84 MSAs included in the analysis. This process produced 502 
comparative counties in the 84 MSAs that include counties with franchises and the control group 
that are counties without franchises in each period. The next step was to identify available and 
relevant longitudinal variables dating back to 1970 that primarily capture demographic market 
characteristics including population and income that indicate market strength within the limitations 
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of available long-term comparable market data. Population was also collected in order to identify 
the centrality of each county within the MSAs. I initially wanted to include data dating back to the 
1950 to capture the post-industrial changes after World War II, but this was not possible because 
of the limitations with census data1. Other limitations include capturing other market conditions 
that could shape decision-making such as business related variables that are not available for the 
periods analyzed in this study. The model includes an income variable and education that reflect 
financial market strengths.  
I base my research on an instrumental-variable estimation model with a causal inference 
based on the centrality of each county relative to the market size of each county in an MSA. I 
estimated the centrality factor (CC) by measuring the sum distances between each county in an 
MSA using county central points defined in GIS. I then used the distances to estimate a centrality 
factor for each county based on the county’s population at a given period and the MSAs population 
at the same period. The equation (I) estimates both the population and income factor for each 
county. 
 
(I)  
County centrality index estimation 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 11 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐=𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚   
Where CC is a measure of centrality for each county in a given MSA, c is given county, di,j is the 
average distance between the county and other counties in the MSA, and m is the MSA. So a 
county in an MSA with only one county will equal 1 (e.g. San Diego). Figure (4) displays the 
                                                             
1 Various census questions were not included in the 1950 and 1960 census, and certain population groups were 
under represented therefore longitudinal data was inconsistent  
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results of the county centrality in the Detroit and Chicago MSAs for 1970 and 2010. As opposed 
to Chicago, Detroit depicts the core’s slight decline and growth of nearby counties between the 
two periods.   
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Figure 2-4: County centrality in the Detroit and Chicago MSAs in 1970 and 2010 
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The estimated county centrality is the basis for the instrumental-variable two-stage 
standard least squared probit estimation model that also considers a cluster robust estimator of the 
variance for the county’s MSA (Williams, 2000). The object of the model is to estimate and use 
the predicted model’s ability to identify the number of markets with a predictive probability greater 
than 0.5 but without a franchise. The two-stage model provides the causal inference between the 
predicted probability and the county’s centrality thus resolving the endogeneity argument that 
could suggest that having a franchise increases the county centrality. It is unlikely but nonetheless 
important to consider this in the model. The results in the next section resolve this argument, at 
least in this study. The relationship between the counties and MSAs takes into consideration the 
possibility that even if the MSA has a large population, franchises will prefer a spatially 
concentrated market and potential locations that capture the concentrated populations. There is 
also the possibility that some MSAs could have more than one location that offers access to densely 
populated spaces. The first stage of the two-stage model is the reduced form equation where the 
endogenous regressor (county’s centrality index) is regressed on the instruments and covariates. 
The second stage is the probit model including the control covariates that are assumed uncorrelated 
with 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 (Bascle, 2008) and the predicted  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�  value.  
(II)  
Reduced form equation for the first-stage instrumental variable estimation  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾0 + �𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + �𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖14
𝑖𝑖=3
2
𝑗𝑗=1
 
Where 𝑍𝑍 are the instrumental variables and 𝑊𝑊 are the covariates included in the probability model. 
The predicted endogenous coefficient 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�  is then included in a probit model as an exogenous 
coefficient outlining the causality between a county’s centrality and the presence of a franchise. 
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The model provides the evidence necessary to determine that franchises, at least in this study, are 
not centrality predictors whereas the centrality coefficient is a determinant predictor for the 
probability that a franchise will locate in a given county.    
(III) 
 Second-stage probit regression including the exogenous covariates and predicted value 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶� . 
Pr�𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 1�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖� = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖13
2
+ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
Where the probability of transitioning from 0 to 1 for county i in time t is assessed using the second 
stage of the two-stage standard least squares and robust clustering taking into consideration the 
MSAs where counties are located. I also estimate a standard probit model including the covariates 
and instrumental variables, as well the county centrality. Comparing the predicted probabilities 𝑌𝑌�  
estimated in each of the models was used to identify the potential markets in each period that did 
not have a franchise.  
 
2.4.1 Data 
The data sample covers five decennial periods from 1970 to 2010 and 502 counties. The dependent 
variable in this study is the presence of a franchise playing in one of the four major leagues in a 
county in each period. Hence, each county has five observations. This takes into account the 
changes that occurred within each county throughout this period and the relative change compared 
to other counties in the metropolitan statistical areas. The number of counties remained consistent 
throughout the five periods but the number of franchises changed (Figure 5). Table 2 displays the 
descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis.   
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Figure 2-5: Number of franchises in the United States included in the dataset in each period 
in total and for each league 
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Table 2-2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max Description Source 
County 2,510 249.82 144.53 1 500 Counties included in the data 1970-2010 US Census 
MSA 2,510 41.90 23.80 1 84 MSA based on 2000 definitions US Census 
Region 2,510 2.39 1.02 1 4 Census Bureau-designated regions US Census 
Population 2,497 324674.20 606723.10 4134 9818605 Population for each county US Census 
Income 2,479 63679.96 16056.25 22762 151906 Household income for each of the counties US Census 
Population (MSA) 2,510 3648964.00 4784327.00 96660 21821921 Aggregate county population in each period US Census 
Income (MSA) 2,502 63033.50 11779.21 25715.72 93643.74 Average county household income in each period US Census 
County centrality 2,500 0.19 0.23 0.01 1 County centrality defined in model I US Census and GIS 
Married 2,502 136325.40 238836.10 1902 3645647 Married people in the county US Census 
Enrolled  2,502 88889.19 170437.60 877 2931076 People above the age of 3 enrolled in school US Census 
Poverty 2,505 37102.01 90350.16 0 1674599 People in the county declared poverty US Census 
Franchise 2,510 0.09 0.29 0 1 Whether a county has a franchise at a given period Various 
Franchise before 2,510 0.08 0.27 0 1 Franchise in the previous period Various  
NFL 2,012 0.06 0.23 0 1 NFL Franchise in the previous season (county) Pro football reference 
NHL 2,012 0.03 0.17 0 1 NHL Franchise in the previous season (county) Hockey reference 
MLB 2,012 0.05 0.21 0 1 MLB Franchise in the previous season (county) Baseball reference 
NBA 2,012 0.04 0.20 0 1 NBA Franchise in the previous season (county) Basketball reference 
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There were a few instances where data were not available for a county in a specific period that is 
one of the limitations when using census data. The 502 counties represent on average 63.8% of the 
entire US population during the five periods (Table 3). The slight increase in the relative size of 
the dataset’s population and the country’s population displays the relative growth of the counties 
in the data compared to the rest of the country. However, the relative size is close throughout the 
duration of the 50-year period. Those numbers alone emphasize the exclusivity of the professional 
sport markets in the US because the percentage of the population within the 502 counties that do 
not have a franchise in their market further increases the gap between franchise markets and the 
entire US population. The population in the 502 counties grew by 56.4% between 1970 and 2010. 
The population and leagues display similar growth patterns, though on different scales.  
Table 2-3: Data and US population (millions) 1970-2010 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Data population 128.48 141.15 158.73 181.44 200.91 
United Stated 203.39 226.55 248.71 281.42 308.75 
Percent 63.17 62.31 63.82 64.47 65.07 
 
Census data for married and people 3 years and older enrolled in school are the instrumental 
variables, and are used in the first-stage to solve for the potential endogeneity problem. I selected 
these variables of their correlation with the size of the population but are unlikely to be impacted 
by the location of a franchise in a given county at a given time. However, even in this instance 
some farfetched arguments can be made that having a franchise reduces the number of people 
married but the model’s results presented in the next section suggest the Wald tests of exogeneity 
are statistically significant. 
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2.5 Results 
I report the regression results for the four estimation models in Table 4. These include the two 
instrumental models, once if a county had a franchise in general in the previous period and again 
if a county had a franchise from each one of the four major leagues. The third and fourth columns 
in the results are for the one-stage probit models. The second part of the results indicates the 
validity of the tests. The results presented in Table 4 do not include all the coefficients such as the 
year, but I do present the more interesting coefficients. I present the actual predictive results from 
the model in the next section where I discuss the predicted probabilities, sensitivity and specificity. 
However, the results below are still important, particularly, their positive or negative effect and 
statistical significance.  
 First, the association between the county centrality and having a franchise is positive and 
statistically significant. This association indicating the increased probability of having a franchise 
based on the county centrality is substantially greater in the two-stage models. This indicates the 
significance of the instrumental variable in the model and exogeneity between having a franchise 
and county centrality. Income is al county centrality so positively associated but the impact is 
marginal. This is not surprising given the increased wealth in the suburbs and the concentration of 
lower income households in several larger cities. Unfortunately, data for other economic variables 
also from non-census data that could affect location such as number of large firms and corporations 
were not available as far back as 1970.  
  In the two probit models without the instrumental variables, married and enrolled in 
school, that were both used in the first-stage instrumental probit model are not statistically 
significant. Both variables were statistically significant in the first-stage model in the two-stage 
analysis. This is not surprising given the correlation between population and marriage and school 
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enrolment and the unlikely correlation between those variables and having a franchise. The regions 
for the most part are not statistically significant, and the results indicate the probabilities compared 
to the Midwest. I set the Midwest as the base because of the substantial changes in the economics 
of that region since the 1950s and the hypothesis that franchises would relocate to other markets 
located elsewhere in the county. The Northeast had a negative association illustrating the decreased 
likelihood that counties in this region would be likely to obtain a franchise if they did not already 
have one, but this was only statistically significant in the first one-stage probit analysis. The other 
region that indicated some statistical significance (though only at the 90% level and in three of the 
four models) is the South. In this instance, counties in the South without franchises, as 
hypothesized, had a greater probability of attracting a franchise when all the other coefficients are 
held constant and if the franchise distributions were not monopolized.   
  
39 
 
Table 2-4: Regression results 
VARIABLES Probit Probit (leagues) IV Probit  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐� ) IV Probit  (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�  leagues) 
County centrality 0.967*** 1.048*** 5.049*** 5.010*** 
 (0.230) (0.282) (0.409) (0.465) 
Income 1.20e-05* 1.04E-05 3.61e-05*** 3.11e-05*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  0.000 
Franchise 
(previous) 3.575*** 
 1.209**  
 (0.275)  (0.596)  
NFL  2.519***  0.688 
  (0.415)  (0.548) 
NHL  1.791***  1.247*** 
  (0.465)  (0.381) 
MLB  0.989  1.120* 
  (0.922)  (0.620) 
NBA  2.923***  1.266** 
  (0.442)  (0.516) 
Northeast -0.456** -0.0521 -0.116 0.0698 
 (0.206) (0.195) (0.251) (0.243) 
South 0.288* 0.291* 0.242* 0.228 
 (0.158) (0.164) (0.145) (0.143) 
West 0.0175 -0.309 -0.173 -0.255 
 (0.219) (0.308) (0.264) (0.286) 
Married 2.34E-06 -7.53E-08 9.55e-07*** 1.12e-06 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
School 2.60E-06 5.89E-06 -8.74e-07 -1.03e-06 
  0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.347*** -3.402*** -1.346*** -2.067*** 
 (0.539) (0.782) (0.481) (0.615)      
Observations 2,472 1,977 2,472 1,977 
 
  Wald test of exogeneity 
(corr = 0): chi2(1) = 
28.54 Prob > chi2 = 
0.0000 
Wald test of exogeneity 
(corr = 0): chi2(1) = 23.98 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Having a franchise in the previous season is positive and statistically significant, which is 
not surprising given that most franchises remained in their market and expansions are limited. The 
two models that estimate the leagues individually also indicate the difference in the leagues’ 
mobility. The NBA and NHL that witnessed the most changes are both statistically significant, 
indicating the probability of counties without franchises switching to counties with a franchise. 
The data also indicated how the NFL and MLB relocated less frequently and therefore the variable 
is less associated with the probability of switching from not having a franchise to having one.  
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While the results displayed in Table 4 are interesting, two other components of the analysis are 
more important. The Wald test in the exogeneity instrumental-variable probit models were both 
statistically significant with zero correlation. This indicates the validity of the test and exogeneity 
between the county centrality and having a franchise. Another indication validating the model is 
the accuracy of the estimation models. In all four models the area under the ROC (receiver 
operating characteristics) curve was close to 99% which indicates the discriminatory accuracy of 
the diagnostic tests in the models and their ability to correctly classify the two states (having a 
franchise and not having a franchise). The accuracy of the models strengthen the arguments made 
in the next section that discuss the post estimation analysis of the sensitivity, specificity and 
predicted probabilities.  
 
2.6 Discussion  
The more interesting consequence of the above models is the predictive analyses that principally 
answer the questions raised in this research. The model identifies “incorrectly” predicted 
observations. These “incorrect” observations are instances where the model predicts that a county 
has a franchise but that is not the case in reality, specifically, predict a false positive. I measure 
these predictive probabilities and outcomes by estimating the sensitivity and specificity of the 
models. Sensitivity is the model’s ability to correctly identify counties with a franchise whereas 
the specificity is the models’ ability to identify correctly the counties that do not have a franchise. 
In both instances, the results displayed in Table 5 emphasize the strength of the model but also 
provide the basis to determine that potential markets existed without franchises. Potentially, in a 
different less monopolistic system these markets would possibly have franchises and decrease the 
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use of relocation threats to bargain for public incentives. The threshold in Table 5 was a probability 
of 0.5, commonly used in these types of analyses (Fielding and Bell, 1997). 
 
Table 2-5: Sensitivity, specificity and model classification 
 Instrumental - All 
Instrumental - 
Leagues Probit - All Probit - Leagues 
 D ~D Total D ~D Total D ~D Total D ~D Total 
+ 189 12 201 159 14 173 189 11 22 162 14 176 
- 38 2233 2271 39 1765 1804 38 2234 2272 36 1765 1801 
Total 227 2245 2472 198 1779 1977 227 2245 2472 198 1779 1977 
Sensitivity 83.26% 80.30% 83.26% 81.31% 
Specificity 99.55% 99.21% 99.51% 99.10% 
Positive predictive  94.03% 91.91% 94.53% 92.05% 
Negative predictive  98.33% 97.84% 98.37% 98.00% 
Correctly classified 97.98% 97.98% 97.32% 98.06% 
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= 0.5 
Sensitivity Pr(+|D) 
Specificity Pr(-|~D) 
Positive predictive value Pr(D|+) 
Negative predictive value Pr(~D|-) 
 
In all four of the models, the analysis reveals the existence of markets without franchises 
at different periods. Based on the predictive post estimate probabilities the model identifies 
markets with franchises that are actually predicted as non-franchise markets. More importantly 
though is the predictive probability of markets without franchises that the data actually predicted 
differently. These are instances where the actual outcome is having no franchise and the model 
predicts a positive outcome. Not all the positive observations were correctly identified and not all 
the negative observations were correctly identified. These results are important because they 
suggest that the predictions are different from the true outcomes. The average positive predictive 
value of the four models is 93.1% whereas the average negative predictive value is 98.1%. In both 
instances, the models predict over 90% of the observations, and overall the models, on average, 
correctly classified 97.8% of the observations. The models, as anticipated, predict some 
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observations that are different from reality, hence the sensitivity and specificity are not 100%. 
Hence, the models predicted that some observations with franchises did not have a franchise based 
on existing data and some counties without franchises had a franchise in the model. Table 6 
presents the counties that the predicted probabilities identified to have a franchise in the models 
despite not having one.  
 
Table 2-6: Counties that the models predicted to have a franchise despite not having one 
(have a predicted probability larger than 0.5) 
Year County MSA State County population 
2010 Clark Las Vegas Nevada 1,951,269 
2010 Essex New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island New Jersey 783,969 
1990 Hampden Springfield Massachusetts 456,310 
2000 Hartford Hartford Connecticut 857,183 
1970 Kings New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island New York 2,602,012 
1980 Kings New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island New York 2,230,936 
2000 Kings New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island New York 2,465,326 
1990 Middlesex New York--Northern New Jersey--Long Island New Jersey 671,780 
1970 Onondaga Syracuse, NY MSA New York 472,746 
1990 Palm Beach West Palm Beach--Boca Raton Florida 863,518 
2000 Palm Beach West Palm Beach--Boca Raton Florida 1,131,184 
2010 Palm Beach West Palm Beach--Boca Raton Florida 1,320,134 
1980 Pulaski Little Rock--North Little Rock, AR MSA Arkansas 340,613 
2010 Riverside Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County California 2,189,641 
2000 San Bernardino Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County California 1,709,434 
2010 San Bernardino Los Angeles--Riverside--Orange County California 2,035,210 
2000 Summit Cleveland--Akron Ohio 542,899 
 
The list is not an extensive list but it also unlikely represents the true number of available 
counties that could potentially host a franchise. This just represents the 0.5 threshold; a 0.4 
threshold would increase the number of counties and could still be a representative of potential 
counties. Most importantly, the list of counties implies that some MSAs have multiple counties 
that are predicted to have a franchise, some of which already have a franchise but there is evidently 
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space for an additional franchise in the MSA in a different county. Interestingly, Clark County 
(NV) and Kings County (NY) both have franchises now.   
Population appears to be one of the fundamental decision-making agendas when 
determining where franchises and arguably businesses in general locate. Clearly, other indicators 
affect where franchises locate other than population, but population appears to be the most 
significant one. Despite this, there are still some larger counties and MSAs that do not have 
franchises while, some relatively small counties and MSAs have franchises. However, other than 
the few instances where franchises play in smaller counties or MSAs we still expect to see a 
significant variance between counties with and without franchises. Table 7 displays county 
population in each of the periods, distinguishing between counties with and without franchises.   
Table 2-7: County population (when available) with and without franchises 1970-2010 
 Count Average Max Min 
Franchise Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1970 31 466 1,460,174 178,576 7,032,075 2,602,012 158,244 4,134 
1980 45 455 1,274,864 184,144 7,477,503 2,230,936 175,280 4,842 
1990 48 452 1,356,060 207,161 8,863,164 2,300,664 194,594 5,315 
2000 52 448 1,473,021 234,028 9,519,338 2,465,326 226,778 5,623 
2010 55 445 1,529,225 262,469 9,818,605 2,504,700 248,007 6,128 
    
Because population is likely an important factor that franchises and leagues consider in an 
attempt to capture large markets, it is interesting to note that the largest county without a franchise 
is substantially larger than the smallest county with a franchise (Table 6). This is likely because 
the Green Bay Packers play in a small local market but have a large fan base that travel to the 
games from other MSAs. Green Bay however is the exception that consistently had a franchise 
despite a small market. However, while Green Bay is an exception, the larger counties without a 
franchise are still substantially more populated than several of the counties with franchises. The 
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same is true for MSA populations. The number of franchises in each league is substantially smaller 
than the number of MSAs, and several franchises from different leagues play in the same markets. 
Hence, there will always be counties and MSAs without franchises, at least so long as the leagues 
are closed, legally protected, and authorized to control the supply of franchises. The fact that 
franchises remained in some markets may also be due to their embedded nature. Additionally, the 
combination of securing public incentives and other non-market dependent revenues such as 
shared-revenues reduce their financial burden and dependency on the local market. However, even 
if franchise owners were interested in relocating, the leagues in conjunction with the other 
franchise owners could potentially block the move. Article 4.2 of the NFL’s constitution and 
bylaws2 clearly indicates this: 
“Article 4.3 requires prior approval by the affirmative vote of three-fourths of the member 
clubs before a club may transfer its franchise or playing site to a different city either within 
or outside its existing home territory. Article 4.3 confirms that each club’s primary 
obligation to the League and to all other member clubs is to advance the interests of the 
League in its home territory. This primary obligation includes, but is not limited to, 
maximizing fan support, including attendance, in its home territory. Article 4.3 also 
confirms that no club has an “entitlement” to relocate simply because it perceives an 
opportunity for enhanced club revenues in another location.”  
 
 
                                                             
2 (https://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/guides/footballstadium/nflfranchiserelocationrules.pdf) 
45 
 
2.7 Conclusions 
My study’s results strengthen the doctrine emphasizing the consequences of the monopolistic 
characteristics of North American professional sport leagues. The fact that there are viable markets 
for franchises because of their population size and market potential strengths implies that various 
forces are in play that may not adhere to open market behavior. This work provides vivid measures 
of the value of the control of the supply of franchises extended to the four major leagues by the 
United States and Canada. As a result, some franchises can easily pursue public incentives that 
reduce their costs as they establish auctions between similarly valuable markets. As long as 
potential markets exist, franchise owners can use them to either negotiate deals in their market or 
seek incentives from alternative markets. Revisiting the relationship described in Figure 2, major 
league markets are determined by the leagues and teams that limit expansions and control 
relocations. The existence of potential markets without franchises identified in this research 
strengthens the relationships described in Figure 2. Public sector officials have limited control over 
the location of franchises other than the incentives they offer, but even then, there is no guarantee 
a franchise will relocate or expand into that market. Because of the competitive imbalance in 
professional sports between leagues playing similar sport, the only way for cities or regions to 
have a major league franchise is by hosting a member of one of the top leagues. Therefore, cities 
cannot use competing leagues and franchises in the bargaining processes in an attempt to reduce 
the public’s financial contribution.  
While there are clear deficiencies in the current system, some benefits exist, particularly 
for cities that suffered economic decline since the mid-20th century. Because of league policies 
such as shared revenues and substantial broadcasting revenues, franchises can be made to be less 
dependent on the local market. Additionally, as this research indicates, the decline of major cities 
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coincided with nearby suburban development so franchises in some instances were able to relocate 
to nearby counties but remain in the market. Another prospect is that while other markets do exist 
they do not necessarily offer better prospects for the league and existing franchises. Franchises are 
less incentivized to relocate and it is more likely that franchises in those markets will be 
expansions. The actual social significance of sport franchises in cities suffering extensive job 
losses and decline is uncertain, but losing a sport franchise can be perceived as another indication 
that the city’s appeal is declining. There are some social amenities related to sport franchises, but 
whether or not they justify public expenditure, is disputed (Groothuis and Rotthoff, 2016). 
Nonetheless, large portions of the population still care about their beloved sports teams. 
Despite the criticism revolving around the relocation debate, the number of franchises 
relocating is not as extreme as is often portrayed. Baseball franchises that are the least mobile and 
possibly several franchises from other leagues may just be more embedded in their local markets 
and therefore less likely to relocate to new ones (Knoben and Oerlemans, 2008). More research is 
required however to determine if that is in fact the case and which franchises are more embedded 
and less likely to relocate. I also reiterate the importance of geographical analyses of the sport 
industry discussing future development and the importance of space and place in sport facility 
finance and the special characteristics of some markets and other variables that could determine 
potential sites for sport franchises.      
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 Enduring Love: the Long-Term Effect of a New Stadium on 
Attendance at Professional English Soccer3 
 
 
Abstract:  
The construction of new stadiums for professional sports teams is often associated with an 
increase in attendance at the facility: the so-called Honeymoon Effect. Drawing on a sample of 
English professional soccer clubs between 1997-2016, we find no tendency for the Honeymoon 
Effect to disappear, even 18 years after a stadium is built. We attribute this “enduring love” to 
the impact of promotion and relegation in the English league system, which gives teams the 
incentive to sustain a consistently higher level of competitive performance following the 
construction of a new stadium.  
 
 
  
                                                             
3 Coauthored with Professor Stefan Szymanski  
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3.1 Introduction 
The construction of new stadiums for professional sports teams is often associated with an increase 
in attendance at the facility: the so-called Honeymoon Effect. Researchers have shown that this 
effect tends to be of limited duration and that within a decade or so of opening a new stadium, 
attendance has reverted to the trend. Almost all of this research concerns facilities located in North 
America. In this paper, we conduct a similar analysis for soccer stadiums in England. In our 
sample, we find little or no evidence that the Honeymoon Effect ever ends. Instead, we find that 
the attendance effect is just as strong and statistically significant up to eighteen years after a new 
stadium is built as it is in the first year; evidence of an “enduring love”.4 However, this is only true 
for the larger stadiums in our sample (capacity over 20,000). For smaller stadiums, we find no 
statistically significant effect, either in the short term or in the long term. 
The focus of this paper is establishing statistically the size of the impact on attendance of 
a new stadium in English professional soccer. However, we also believe that such a stark contrast 
requires us to hazard an explanation. Some might argue that the nature of professional sports in 
North America and the UK are so different that the comparison is meaningless. There certainly are 
differences, but then it is also true to say that North American sports are not completely 
homogeneous, and the previous literature compared baseball, football, basketball and hockey at 
major and minor league levels.  
                                                             
4 We thought long and hard about the title for this paper, considering the easy intuition implied by the “Honeymoon 
Effect”. In essence, our paper suggests that the relationship between the stadium and the fans may be long-lasting or 
even permanent, like a successful marriage. We consulted an expert in comparative literature, Professor Silke-Maria 
Weineck of the University of Michigan who provided several suggestions. She pointed out that literature in general 
is less interested in successful marriages and more interested in the many ways in which they fail, which perhaps has 
something in common with the economics literature. One title adopted for an earlier version of the paper was “The 
Baucis and Philemon Effect”, named for an elderly and happily married couple who were the subject of a poem by 
Ovid, but this seemed a little obscure. We settled on “Enduring Love”, the title of a novel by Ian McEwen, which, 
appropriately enough for sports fans, carries a double meaning: not only a love that lasts, but also a love which has 
to be endured. 
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Professional sports leagues in the two regions have much in common. Their business 
models rely on revenues generated by matchday sales, sponsorships, merchandise and broadcast 
rights; their costs derive primarily from wages and capital investment in the form of a stadium. 
While there are many institutional differences, one of the most important is that North American 
teams are typically organized according to a “closed league” model, while English clubs operate 
in an “open league” model (as do professional soccer clubs in most other parts of the world).  
In the closed league model, the number of franchises is fixed, and new entry of teams only 
occurs through expansion determined by commercial considerations. By contrast, in the open 
model, new entry of teams occurs through “promotion and relegation”, a system whereby clubs in 
lower leagues gain access purely on sporting merit (by finishing the season at the top of their table), 
replacing clubs that are “demoted” purely because of their poor sporting performance (finishing at 
the bottom of their league table).  
It is commonly argued that a new stadium will provide an incentive for owners to invest in 
team quality, this argument frequently being advanced by the team owners themselves (see e.g. 
deMause and Cagan (2008), who review many such claims). Evidence of an impact actually 
materializing is, at best, mixed. Quinn et al (2003) examined the effect of a new stadium on team 
winning percentage in the NFL, NBA and MLB. They found no significant effect in the NFL or 
NBA, but a small effect for MLB. Even if there were no actual improvement in team quality, 
consumers might believe that promises will be kept. In this case, the honeymoon effect could be a 
kind of rational bubble, in which there is a temporary boost of interest in the team, until beliefs are 
revised in the light of actual performance. In a closed league system, team owners have limited 
financial incentives to follow through on promises of improved quality since the league status of 
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the team is unchanging, while the end of season ranking of a team makes little difference to the 
fans, once out of playoff contention.5  
In the open system, however, a higher league rank can lead to promotion to a higher 
division. Clubs in higher divisions generate higher revenues, and so can sustain a higher level of 
performance in the long run. We find that teams with new stadiums do tend to sustain a higher 
league rank after a stadium is constructed, implying that they may be benefitting from this effect. 
The paper is set out as follows. The next section reviews the literature on stadium demand 
and the Honeymoon Effect. Section 3 describes some of the institutional background to the 
investment in new stadiums in English soccer. Section 4 describes our data set and estimating 
model. Section 5 reviews our econometric results and section 6 concludes. 
 
3.2 The Honeymoon Effect Literature 
There have been numerous economic studies of the determinants of attendance at professional 
league sports events, stretching now over several decades. As long ago as 2003, Borland and 
Macdonald summarized and categorized more than 60 econometric studies of the determinants of 
attendance at professional sports events. Studies have controlled for the impact of variables such 
as prices, team quality, uncertainty of outcome, time of day, time of year, and so on. The variable 
of interest in this paper is the presence of a new stadium, and its effect on attendance over the first 
two decades of its life. 
                                                             
5 In a fully rational model, fans would discount the non-credible promises of owners and so the promises would have 
no effect on attendance. However, in this case, the novelty of a new stadium could be sufficient to generate the 
honeymoon effect. 
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We identified sixteen papers in the literature involving some statistical analysis of new 
stadium effects, dating back to the work of Roger Noll in 1974. The nature of the discussion in 
this research varies quite widely, but most papers conclude that the honeymoon effect is limited in 
duration (see Table 1). Most studies found that the impact of a new stadium diminishes over time, 
and no study found a significant impact after ten years.  However, not all studies estimated a trend, 
and typically the time horizon for the estimates was only ten years. All but one of these studies 
concern North American leagues. 
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Table 3-1: Honeymoon Effect literature 
 
To focus on the length of the Honeymoon Effect, we selected only those papers that estimated a 
trend in the data. Where necessary, we converted the estimate into a percentage using the league 
average attendance. Table 2 shows the estimates from seven studies covering eight leagues (some 
of which relate to the same league but different sample periods). Year 1 refers to the year in which 
the new facility opened, and the longest post-opening time horizon was fifteen years. Only 
estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level are reported. All but one of these 
sets of estimates shows the Honeymoon Effect reliably decreasing over time, and the simple 
average reported in the final column shows a monotonic decline from year 1 (where the average 
Authors League1 Honeymoon2 
(years)
Horizon 
(years)
Honeymoon trend
1 Noll, 19744 MLB (1970-71) 11 11 Decline
2 Baade, and Tiehen, 19904 MLB (1969-87) 0 11 None
3 Kahane, and Shmanske, 19974 MLB (1990-92) 5 5 No trend estimated
4 Quirk and Fort, 19974 MLB (1960-82) 5 5 No trend estimated
5 Clapp, and Hakes, 20053 MLB (1950-2002) 8 10 Decline 
6 Coates, and Humphreys, 20053 MLB (1961-2001) 8 10 Decline
6 Coates, and Humphreys, 20053 NBA (1961-2001) 9 10 Constant
6 Coates, and Humphreys, 20053 NFL (1961-2001) 0 10 None
7 Clapp, and Hakes, 20053 MLB (1950-2002) 8 10 Decline 
8 Leadley, and Zygmont, 20053 NBA (1971-2000) 10 15 Decline
9 McEvoy, et al., 20053 MLB (1962-2001) Not indicated 75 Decline   
10 Zygmont, and Leadley, 20053 MLB (1970-2000) 9 15 Decline
11 Feddersen, et al., 20064 BL (1964-2004) 5 5 No trend estimated
12 Leadley, and Zygmont, 20063 NHL (1970-2003) 8 10 Decline
13 Agha, 20134 MiLB (1985-2006) 5 5 No trend estimated
14 Love, et al., 20133 MLS (1996-2011) 4 16 Decline
15 Gitter, and Rhodas, 20143 MiLB (1992-2006) 10 10 Decline
16 Soebbing, et al., 20163 CH (1996-2007) 5 10 Decline
1. League abbreviations: Major League Baseball (MLB, National Basketball Association (NBA), 
National football Association (NFA), National Hockey League (NHL), Major League Soccer (MLS), 
Minor League Baseball (MiLB), German Bundesliga (BL), Canadian Hockey (CH)
2. Reported “Honeymoon” and the duration that variable is statistically significance
3. Research focuses on new stadiums
4. Includes the novelty effect in the model and analysis but is not the paper’s focus
5. The authors do not indicate the duration of the honeymoon effect but mentioned that the effect 
is apparent
57 
 
jump in attendance is 38%) to year 13, by which point the average affect is zero. The graph of the 
simple average is shown in figure 1. We now turn to the impact of new stadiums on attendance at 
English soccer. Only one previous study (Feddersen et al. 2006) has considered a league outside 
North America, and their estimation method assumed a constant effect over a relatively short 
period (five years). 
Table 3-2: Estimated trend of the Honeymoon Effect 
 
Zygmont 
and 
Leadley 
(2005)
Leadley 
and 
Zygmont 
(2005)
Coates and 
Humphreys 
(2005)
Coates and 
Humphreys 
(2005)
Coates and 
Humphreys 
(2005)
Clapp and 
Hakes 
(2005)
Leadley 
and 
Zygmont 
(2006)
Gitter and 
Rhoads 
(2014)
Gitter and 
Rhoads 
(2014)
Gitter and 
Rhoads 
(2014)
Soebbing et 
al (2016)
Simple  
average
Age (1 = 
year 
facility 
opened)
MLB (1970-
2000)
NBA (1971-
2000)
MLB (1969 - 
2001)
NBA (1969 - 
2001)
NFL (1969 - 
2001)
MLB (1950-
2002)
NHL (1970-
2003)
MiLB A 
(1992-2006)
MiLB AA 
(1992-
2006)
MiLB 
AAA 
(1992-
2006)
Minor 
League 
Hockey 
(1996 = 2007)
1 44% 50% 22% 36% 38%
2 32% 16% 28% 6% 9% 27% 22% 47% 16% 36% 46% 24%
3 18% 19% 21% 8% 9% 20% 19% 41% 19% 35% 45% 21%
4 19% 22% 19% 6% 8% 19% 18% 40% 11% 27% 44% 19%
5 25% 25% 14% 5% 10% 19% 19% 31% 8% 23% 42% 18%
6 23% 18% 15% 6% 10% 15% 21% 21% 3% 9% 37% 14%
7 17% 13% 12% 4% 6% 15% 16% 21% 3% 8% 29% 12%
8 25% 11% 11% 5% 5% 10% 11% 17% -2% 7% 21% 10%
9 21% 8% 16% 2% 5% 10% 8% 14% 0% 6% 15% 9%
10 15% 8% 6% 3% 6% 3% 3% 12% 1% 5% -1% 6%
11 3% 8% 8% 1% 9% 3% 4% -1% 5%
12 1% 2% 2%
13 -1% 6% 2%
14 -4% 4% 0%
15 0% 3% 1%
16 1% 5% 3%
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Figure 3-1: Simple Average of Honeymoon effect on match attendance (% increase relative 
to base) for North American professional sports teams 
 
 
3.3 New Stadiums in English Soccer 
Soccer is the most popular professional team sport in England, with average annual attendance in 
the region of 30 million per year across 92 professional clubs in the 2000s. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the English leagues are organized hierarchically, with the Premier League (20 clubs) 
at the top, then the EFL Championship (24 clubs), then EFL League One (24 clubs) and then EFL 
League Two (24 clubs). At the end of each season, three clubs are relegated from the Premier 
League to the Championship, and replaced by three promoted teams. Likewise, three teams move 
in each direction between the Championship and League One, four teams between League One 
and League Two, while two teams are relegated from League Two to the fifth tier, replaced by two 
teams from the fifth tier. 
English soccer experienced a significant decline from the 1950s onwards, which reached 
crisis proportions in the 1980s. A combination of soccer hooliganism and underinvestment in 
facilities caused attendance to fall dramatically. Unlike the US, TV revenues were modest before 
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the 1990s (Baimbridge et al. 1996; Forrest et al. 2004; Gannon et al. 2006), and by the late 1980s 
a significant number of clubs had entered the UK equivalent of Chapter XI proceedings 
(Szymanski, 2017). It is commonly accepted that the Hillsborough disaster of 1989, when 96 
Liverpool fans were crushed to death because of mismanagement of an antiquated stadium, 
represented a turning point for the English game.6 Following a public inquiry commissioned by 
the government, (Taylor Report, 1990) legislation was passed requiring clubs in the top two 
divisions to convert to all-seater stadiums. The government also provided subsidies and loans to 
enable clubs to comply with the legislation. 
Since the 1990s, English professional soccer has enjoyed a renaissance. This is associated 
with substantial increases in broadcasting revenues derived from pay TV, both in the UK and 
internationally. Demand for attendance has also increased, and while fans have consistently 
complained about steeply rising ticket prices, annual attendance between 1990 and 2016 increased 
over 50% in aggregate. 
Figures 2 to 4 illustrate attendance trends, between 1974 and 2016, for each of the divisions. 
Figure 2 shows total attendance, figure 3 shows total stadium capacity and figure 4 shows capacity 
utilization. In the period prior to 1990 when demand was falling, stadium capacities were reduced, 
partly as a response to various safety measures that had been introduced. However, as demand 
increased in the 1990s, stadium capacity remained broadly flat. Consequently, as illustrated by 
figure 4, capacity utilization rose significantly, especially in the upper two tiers. By the end of the 
1990s, the top tier (the Premier League) was playing to over 90% capacity on average, while the 
second tier (Championship) was at around 70% of capacity. Note that while utilization rose 
                                                             
6 Although, in fact, recorded attendance started to rise from 1986 onwards. 
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significantly in the bottom two tiers, demand generally remained below 50% of capacity. Yet, 
because of the potential increase in demand associated with promotion, few clubs at those levels 
have chosen to shed capacity. 
The poor state of English soccer’s antiquated stadiums was often advanced as a causal 
explanation for the game’s problems in the 1970s and 80s. In 1988, 46% of the 92 professional 
league clubs were playing in stadiums built before 1900, 33% in stadiums built between 1900 and 
1914 and 17% in stadiums built between 1919 and 1939. The remaining three stadiums had been 
built in the first decade after World War Two. More than twenty stadiums suffered bomb damage 
during that conflict and required reconstruction, of varying degrees of significance, funded in part 
by the government.7 More generally, clubs had invested over the decades to expand stadium 
capacity, but little had been spent on improving stadium quality. 
 
Figure 3-2: Average game attendance by tier (1974-2016) 
 
 
                                                             
7 Manchester United’s stadium was completely destroyed and, for four years after the War, played their games at 
the stadium of local rivals Manchester City.  
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Figure 3-3: Average stadium capacity by tier (1974-2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Capacity utilization (attendance/capacity) by tier (1974-2016) 
 
 
By 1975, the physical state of many stadium had become such a pressing issue that the government 
passed legislation requiring soccer clubs to invest in order to ensure the safety of fans attending 
games. This was not enough to prevent the Bradford fire disaster in 1985 when 56 fans were burned 
to death at a game when an old wooden grandstand caught fire (Inglis, 1996).  
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Since 1988 there has been a boom in the construction of new soccer stadiums. Table 3 lists 
the thirty-two new stadiums that opened during the period 1988-2012, built for clubs playing in 
the four English professional soccer leagues.  
Table 3-3: Financing, ownership, and estimated and reported costs for clubs with new 
stadium 
Club Year Financing 
/ owner
Operator Capacity Estimated /reported costs 
(2015 prices millions)1
Scunthorpe United 1988 Private Scunthorpe United 11,000 12.3
Walsall F.C. 1990 Private Walsall FC 11,000 10.1
Wycombe Wanderers 1990 Private Wycombe Wanderers 10,000 7.3
Yeovil Town 1990 Private Yeovil Town 9,565 7.8
Chester City 1992 Public Chester City 6,012 6.05
Millwall F.C. 1993 Joint Millwall Holdings PLC 20,000 28.2
Huddersfield Town 1994 Joint Kirkless Stadium Development 20,000 28.7
Northampton Town 1995 Public Northampton Council 7,600 10.4
Middlesbrough F.C. 1995 Private Middlesbrough Fc 30,000 28.7
Bolton Wanderers 1997 Private Burnden Leisure (parent) 25,000 47.8
Crawley Town 1997 Public Crawley Town 5,000 8.8
Derby County 1997 Private Derby County 33,000 34.9
Stoke City 1997 Joint Stoke City 28,384 23.4
Sunderland F.C. 1997 Private Sunderland AFC 42,000 33.3
Reading F.C. 1998 Private Reading FC 24,200 57.8
Wigan F.C. 2000 Private Wigan Athletic 25,000 44.75
Oxford United 2001 Private Oxford United 12,450 30.8
Southampton F.C. 2001 Private Southampton FC 32,551 44
Hull City 2002 Public Superstadium (Allamhouse) 25,404 62
Leicester City 2002 Private Parent Company 32,500 54.2
Manchester City 2003 Public City Football Group 48,000 166.2
Coventry City 2005 Public Coventry City (lease) 32,000 147.5
Swansea City 2005 Public Swansea City 20,000 35.2
Arsenal F.C. 2006 Private Arsenal (Emirates Stadium) 60,000 538.1
Doncaster Rovers 2007 Public Doncaster Rovers 15,269 38.5
MK Dons 2007 Private Inter MK 22,000 60
Shrewsbury F.C. 2007 Private Shrewsbury Town 10,000 18
Colchester F.C. 2008 Public Colchester Community Stadium 10,000 17.8
Cardiff City 2009 Private Cardiff City FC (Holdings) 26,828 51.6
Morecambe F.C. 2009 Private Morecambe FC 6,402 13.9
Brighton & Hove Albion 2011 Private The Community Stadium 22,374 109.7
Rotherham United 2012 Private Rotherham United 12,009 20.7
1. Notes for each of the clubs including data sources appear in Appendix 1  
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 Where possible, we derived the data on construction costs from the financial statements of the 
soccer clubs, which typically own the stadium. However, in some cases, ownership is held 
elsewhere and we relied on public records and newspaper reports. The total estimated cost of all 
the new stadiums was £1.79 billion (in 2015 prices), of which we estimate £515.8 million (29%) 
was provided from public subsidies (In the appendix we detail the sources from which these figures 
were drawn). While still substantial, this is a lower subsidy rate than in North America over a 
comparable period. Long (2012) reports that the average rate of public subsidy for major league 
stadiums in North America was 61% in the 1980s, 54% in the 1990s and 61% in the 2000s. 
Comparing the first season in the new stadium and the last season in the old one, these investments 
increased capacity by approximately 42% on average.  
 
3.4 Data and Estimating Model 
We have set out to follow as far as possible the estimating strategy adopted in the Honeymoon 
Effect literature described above. A key feature of that literature is that it generally controls for 
wealth and population size through an income variable such as per capita income. One challenge 
for a comparative evaluation is the relative density of professional clubs (compounded by the 
absence of territorial exclusivity). England has 92 professional clubs in the top four divisions, 
serving an area that is between the size of Louisiana and Mississippi. Regional data on income for 
England at the official “NUTS 3” level is the most disaggregated measure available, dividing the 
country into 145 regions,8 and is only available on an annual basis since 1997. This data is available 
                                                             
8 There are 173 NUTS 3 regions for the UK in total, of which 145 are in England and Wales: Welsh clubs are 
permitted to play in the English league system. 
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online from the UK Office of National Statistics. Population data at the NUTS 3 level is available 
online from Eurostat. 
 Our data sample covers twenty seasons, running from 1996/97 until 2015/16. Our measure 
of attendance is the average per game attendance in league competition as reported in the Sky 
Sports Yearbook, published annually. Over our sample period, the number of home games played 
annually in each division has been constant at 19 in the Premier League and 23 in the other three 
divisions. We do not include games played in other competitions such as the FA Cup or the 
Champions League, which are much fewer in number, since demand for these games is likely to 
be driven by different factors, for which we cannot easily obtain controls.9 Stadium capacity and 
team performance data came from the same source. One measure of team performance is league 
rank, but this is clearly endogenous. Hence, we use club annual wage spending data taken from 
the financial statements of the club, which are now freely accessible online at Companies House.10 
 Following the previous literature, we measure the impact of new stadiums on attendance 
by regressing attendance on a set of controls, based on the variables described below, and a series 
of dummies indicating the age of the new stadium, from year 1 (the year the stadium opened), up 
to year 18 after opening. Table 4 lists all of our variables of interest and their summary statistics.  
 We want to allow for differences in team performance, not only within the same league 
division, but also across divisions. We do this by taking account of the strict hierarchy in the league 
system. At the end of each season, each team has a league position (1st, 2nd, 3rd…) which is the 
usual measure of relative standing. Since the Premier League clubs are at the top of the hierarchy, 
                                                             
9 For example, many clubs tie season ticket sales to a commitment to buy FA Cup tickets. 
10 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house. The annual wage bill of a club is 
largely determined before the season starts, but endogeneity issues can still arise. Hall et al (2002) tested for 
exogeneity of wage spending for English soccer clubs and found that this could not be rejected. 
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we can say that their league position is also a measure of their rank across the four divisions. For 
teams in lower divisions then their rank in the system should take account of the divisions above 
them. Thus, the team in 1st position in the Football League Championship can be assigned rank 21 
in the system, the team in 2nd position can be assigned rank 22, and so on. As a result, we can 
construct a consistent ranking of teams from season to season, even if they play in different 
divisions (following promotion or relegation). We do not include prices as controls, since these 
are well known to raise problems of identification (Noll, 2013). Variations in prices across clubs 
can to some extent be accounted for through fixed effects. 
 Figure 5 shows the average share of total attendance for clubs with new stadiums, both at 
the divisional level and across all fours leagues, depending on the age of the stadium. In both cases 
we can see a clear jump in attendance in year 1, the year that the new stadium is opened. While 
the average share of division is higher after the opening of the new stadium, there is also some 
decline, following the initial impact, and in some years, the share falls below the level experienced 
in some seasons before the opening of the new stadium. However, this fails to take account of the 
fact that clubs can play in different divisions. When we consider the four divisions together, the 
share of attendance of clubs with new stadiums is consistently higher than it was before their 
stadiums were built, and the share appears to be rising over time. 
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Table 3-4: Description (including summary statistics) and sources for the variable included in the models 
Variable Description N Mean Standard 
deviation
Min Max Data source
Attendance (ATT)  Average per game attendance for each club
1,748 14,587 13,256 1,414 75,826
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Lag attendance Average per game attendance for each club in the 
previous season 1,717 14,574 13,117 1,414 75,826
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Season (SEAS) Dummy variable with 2006 as a base year
1,748 2006.5 5.768 1997 2016
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Rivals (RIVALS) Other clubs in the NUTS3 region 1,748 4.174 2.019 0 8 Observed using GIS
Tiers (TIER) Dummy variable with tier 1 (Premier League) as the 
base 1,748 2.565 1.097 1 4
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Performance (PERF) Inversed log of rank * (1-92) divided by 93-rank
1,748 -4.511 1.697 -9.033 0.011
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Promotion  (PROM) Dummy variable (1) if club was promoted previous 
year 1,748 0.109 0.312 0 1
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Relegation (RELG) Dummy variable (1) if club was relegated previous 
year 1,748 0.113 0.316 0 1
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Champions League (CL) Dummy variable (1) if club was qualified for 
Champions League previous year 1,748 0.038 0.192 0 1
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Other European (EU) Dummy variable (1) if club qualified for the second 
European competition previous year 1,748 0.038 0.192 0 1
Skysports football 
yearbooks 
Wages (WAG) Wage bill for club i in season t divided by average 
wage (all clubs) in season t 
1,338 0.998 1.241 0 0.018 7.939 Financial statements
Population NUTS3 region population (based on 2016 regions) 1,748 419,943 210,659 97,991 1,160,451 Eurostat
GDHI NUTS3 region Gross Domestic Household Income  
(based on 2016 regions at current base prices)
1,748 6,212 3,903 956 28,253 Office for National 
Statistics 
GDHI per capita (INC  ) NUTS3 GDHI per capita GDHI  (based on 2016 
regions at current base prices)  
1,748 14,639 5,999 6,448 59,612 Office for National 
Statistics
Capacity Stadium capacity (full and 95% (capacityit *0.95) 1,748 20,885 12,881 4,057 76,212
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Capacity groups (CAPBIN) Five capacity bins based on 10,000 intervals
1,748 3.43 1.228 1 5
Skysports football 
yearbooks
Diff-in-diff Dummy variable (1) for clubs with new stadium for 
all seasons 1,748 0.317 0.466 0 1
Skysports football 
yearbooks and online 
sources
Stadium age (AGE) Dummy variable for stadium age for any stadiums 
between 1-19 and stadium age grouped into 1-5,6-
10,11-15, 16+
1,748 1.965 4.45 0 19
Skysports football 
yearbooks and online 
sources
Capacity groups*Stadium 
age (CAP*AGE)
Interaction of stadium age (or groups) and capacity 
bins 1,748 46,348 118,102 0 935,433
Skysports football 
yearbooks and online 
sources
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Figure 3-5: Average attendance share of clubs that built a new stadium 
 
For our regression analysis we estimate a difference-in-difference model where the 
differences are staggered according to the date at which the stadium was opened. This follows the 
methodology adopted by Stevenson and Wolfers (2006). Our dependent variable is average 
seasonal league attendance per game. Our controls are local market factors (population and income 
per capita, as well as the number of clubs located in the same NUTS 3 area) and league 
performance as proxied by the team wage bill. We also include divisional dummies and dummies 
for whether the team was promoted or relegated in the previous season, to account for potential 
encouragement and discouragement effects. We include team and seasonal fixed effects. 
 Our main variables of interest are a series of treatment dummies reflecting the age of a new 
stadium. However, we need to take account of the differing scale of the clubs in our sample. The 
Emirates Stadium that opened in 2006 has a capacity of 60,000 and was built for Arsenal Football 
Club, a team that played in the top division for the last 100 years. By contrast, the Globe Arena, 
which opened in 2010 and has a capacity of 6,400, was built for Morecambe FC (founded 1920), 
a club which was promoted to the fourth tier for first time in its history in 2007, and remained at 
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this level throughout the remainder of our sample period. To take account of stadium size we 
divided stadiums into five capacity bins, which were then interacted with stadium age. Table 5 is 
a cross tabulation that relates the stadium capacity for each club in our dataset, in each season, to 
the division (tier) in which the club played. As might be expected, clubs with larger stadium 
capacities tend to play in the higher divisions. Nonetheless, clubs with relatively small stadiums 
sometimes play in the highest tiers, and clubs with relatively large stadiums are sometimes found 
playing in the lower tiers. Table 6 illustrates the same relationship but for clubs with new stadiums 
– the data follows a similar pattern.  
Table 3-5: Number of capacity bin observations in each tier 
Capacity bins Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Total
Bin group 1 148 7 155
Bin group 2 118 134 24 276
Bin group 3 121 210 99 32 462
Bin group 4 13 107 219 522 522
Bin group 5 22 138 425 425  
Bin 1=largest capacity quintile, 5=smallest capacity quintile 
Bin 1 >40,000 
Bin 2 = 30,001-40,000 
Bin 3 = 20,001-30,000 
Bin 4 = 10,001-20,000 
Bin 5 <10,000 
 
Table 3-6: Number of capacity bin observations of clubs with new stadiums in each tier 
Capacity bins Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 Total
Bin group 1 37 5 42
Bin group 2 17 42 7 66
Bin group 3 41 44 22 3 110
Bin group 4 7 13 16 36
Bin group 5 5 9 14  
Bin capacity as defined in Table 5 
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Our estimating equation is written as:   
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  × 𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖1988) + 𝛿𝛿𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+  �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +
𝑖𝑖
�𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
 
 
Treatment is a dummy variable equal to one if the team opened a new stadium since 1988, and 
zero otherwise, and βt is the difference-in-difference estimator for year t after the opening of the 
new stadium. Our control variables are defined in Table 4. 
 We also consider a variant where we constrain the stadium age coefficients to be equal for 
successive five-year periods, i.e. years 1-5, 6-10, 11-15 and 16-18 (there are only three periods in 
the last case).  
 We consider a number of tests for robustness. First, since some clubs were sold out in some 
seasons we estimate a Tobit model allowing for capacity constraints. Second, we estimate a model 
including the lag dependent variable, to allow for persistence effects. Third, to allow for the 
possibility that pooling the data across divisions is not warranted we estimate a model separately 
for teams in tiers 1 and 2 separately from teams in tiers 3 and 4. Finally, we estimate the previous 
model and include the lagged dependent variable. In the main text we report our preferred 
specification and the Tobit model, in the appendix we report the results of the other models. 
 
3.5 Econometric Results 
We report our regression results in two sections. First, Table 7 reports the estimates for the control 
variables and Table 8 reports the stadium age estimates. Tables 7 and 8 report four versions of our 
estimating equation. Two are fixed effects estimates: one with and one without stadium age 
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coefficient constraints; two are Tobit estimates, allowing for the fact that some clubs in some years 
appeared to operate at full capacity across the season.  
The results in Table 7 seem largely intuitive. There are large differences in attendance 
depending on the division in which a club plays. Team quality/success, as proxied by wages, 
significantly adds to attendance. Teams that were promoted the previous season enjoy an 
additional bounce, associated with playing in a higher division, and teams which were relegated 
the previous season also benefit from a higher attendance than clubs playing in the same division, 
all else equal. The former effect can be attributed to pent-up demand to watch the team play at 
higher level, while the latter effect may reflect optimism that the team will rebound and be 
promoted back up in the near future. Attendance is significantly related to per capita income in the 
local area. The presence of rival clubs is not significant, perhaps since rivals can both reduce 
attendance (through substitution) and increase attendance (by generating local interest). 
Participation in European level competitions (notably the Champions League) does not appear to 
affect attendance at league games, although clubs that play in Europe are the better quality teams, 
so any effect may be caught by the wage variable. 
The estimated coefficients across these four variants seem relatively stable, with only small 
differences in the size of the coefficients. The pattern of statistical significance is consistent, across 
the four variants. The Tobit and Fixed Effects estimates are very similar, although this may be 
because only a small number of clubs are right-censored in any one season.  
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Table 3-7: Attendance regression models 
FE with diff-in-diff FE with diff-in-diff 
(constrained)
Tobit with diff-in-
diff
Tobit with diff-in-diff 
(constrained)  
Rivals -141.2 -119.7 -154.6 -133.3
(129.30) (125.50) (118.70) (119.00)
Tier 2 -4,558*** -4,679*** -4,645*** -4,754***
(331.40) (317.40) (305.90) (302.50)
Tier 3 -6,953*** -7,079*** -7,081*** -7,198***
(428.20) (409.40) (395.60) (390.40)
Tier 4 -7,703*** -7,796*** -7,849*** -7,941***
(516.60) (494.30) (476.80) (471.00)
Wages 1,268*** 1,219*** 1,237*** 1,192***
(227.50) (219.40) (209.50) (208.60)
Promotion 728.4*** 653.3*** 735.9*** 673.8***
(228.70) (216.30) (210.80) (206.00)
Relegation 776.0*** 748.2*** 783.2*** 755.1***
(232.40) (220.20) (213.50) (208.90)
Champions League -765.7 -760.8 -710.1 -713.2
(616.90) (597.10) (569.00) (568.60)
Other European 79.6 106 47.5 82.23
(350.70) (338.60) (322.70) (321.60)
GDHI per capita 0.0989** 0.101*** 0.0928** 0.0956**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Diff-in-diff 987.3 1,248 789.9 930
-2,429 -2,220 -2,227 -2,107
Constant 16,341*** 16,262*** 16,453*** 16,356***
(2,182) (2,133) (2,004) (2,023)
R^2 0.9778 0.9772
Observations 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336
Number of Clubs 96 96 96 96
Right censored 17 17  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We report the estimates for stadium age in Table 8. These estimates are based on our definition of 
capacity bins (see tables 5 and 6), with bin 1 defined as the reference group. Hence, the figures in 
the table are the sum of the reference group estimate and the capacity bin estimate. On the left had 
side of Table 8 are the Fixed Effects estimates, with the Tobit estimates on the right hand side; the 
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top panels report the estimates for each year, the lower panels reported the estimates when the age 
coefficients are constrained to be equal for five year periods. 
The estimates suggest that there is a large and relatively stable impact of a new stadium on 
attendance in each of the three largest capacity bins – meaning stadiums larger than 20,000 seats. 
By contrast, the impact on attendance at the smaller stadiums is, while almost invariably positive, 
rarely significant at the 5% level or better. For the largest group (40,000+) the average impact is 
around 10,000 per year, and the effect does not appear to diminish over time. For the second bin 
(30,000-40,000) the estimated effect is around 7,000 and for the third bin (20,000-30,000) is 
around 3,000. Most of these estimates are significant at the 1% level. While it does appear that 
estimates for bin 2 are insignificant in years 16, 17 and 18, this may be due to the small number of 
observations for these years. The constrained estimates in the lower panels are useful for 
illustrating the consistency of the results.  
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Table 3-8: Linear point estimates for stadium age and stadium age groups (Number of observations 
in parentheses) 
Age (obs) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 (21) 11541*** 7979*** 3301*** 626 1326 11766*** 7577*** 3406*** 588 1202
2 (24) 12778*** 7356*** 1365 748 1545 12593*** 7061*** 1477 730 1451
3 (26) 10951*** 7958*** 3060*** 1018 1604 10731*** 7686*** 3196*** 961 1466
4 (26) 11992*** 6868*** 2737*** -67 1090 11776*** 6574*** 2852*** -84 975
5 (26) 12386*** 5658*** 2999*** -884 1554 12162*** 5269*** 3090*** -923 1419
6 (25) 9347*** 4652*** 2576*** -998 -669 9162*** 4368*** 2675*** -1034 -698
7 (26) 7000*** 3744*** 2790*** 1177 62 6828*** 3287*** 2879*** 1125 45
8 (26) 7714*** 3948*** 3872*** 3424 1443 7576*** 3619*** 3976*** 3330 1412
9 (25) 8078*** 5574*** 3100*** 2770 3332* 7865*** 5125*** 3187*** 2665 3414**
10 (23) 6080*** 4715*** 2418** 2830 2430 5908*** 4358*** 2503*** 2742 2471
11 (21) 10064*** 5626*** 1719 3105 3186* 9839*** 5156*** 1815* 3034 3248**
12 (19) 8196*** 6343*** 2227** 3221 1441 7962*** 5866*** 2317** 3105 2718
13 (20) 9296*** 6634*** 1721 1743 1947 9127*** 6133*** 1805* 1637 2110
14 (21) 9373*** 6141*** 2763** 1586 2120 9203*** 5575*** 2872*** 1476 2245
15 (18) 8349*** 6620*** 2994*** 1369 2369 8178*** 6267*** 3082*** 1309 2542
16 (16) 9764*** 49 3399*** 2367* 1785 9568*** -300 3494*** 2275* 1925
17 (16) 10554*** 1870 2825** 2675* 2256 10359*** 1517 2918** 2584** 2415
18 (14) 12615*** -1947 3389** 1920 1359 12411*** -2318 3461** 1810 1489
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1-5 (123) 11955*** 7187*** 2800*** 739 1694 11843*** 6873*** 2904*** 709 1582
6-10 (125) 7874*** 4601*** 2962*** 1531 1675* 7703*** 4249*** 3051*** 1455 1683*
11-15 (99) 9192*** 6317*** 2307*** 1559 1961* 8999*** 5841*** 2396*** 1452 2402**
16+ (46) 11132*** -251 3125*** 1895** 1700 10947*** -597 3208*** 1786** 1906
FE with diff-in-diff Tobit with diff-in-diff
FE with diff-in-diff (constrained) Tobit with diff-in-diff (constrained)  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Bin 1=largest capacity quartile, 4=smallest capacity quartile, Bin 1>40,000, Bin 2 = 30,001-40,000, Bin 3 = 
20,001-30,000, Bin 4 = 10,001-20,000, Bin 5 <10,000 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the estimated coefficients for each of the bins. The dotted lines show the 
unconstrained estimates, the solid lines are the constrained estimates. These charts help to 
demonstrate the consistency of the size of our estimates, and the absence, in general, of any 
tendency for the initial impact to decline. New stadiums in English soccer really do appear to create 
an enduring bond with the fans. 
 
Our alternative models (see appendices) suggest that our findings are robust. In each variant, we 
find the same result: new stadium effects, where they are significant, are sustained and constant. 
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Figure 3-6: Linear point estimates of attendance effect based on stadium age from year 1 
(opening) to year 18, by capacity bin groups 
 
Bin 1>40,000, Bin 2 = 30,001-40,000, Bin 3 = 20,001-30,000, Bin 4 = 10,001-20,000, Bin 5 <10,000 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
As we suggested in the introduction, we think that one explanation for the difference between our 
findings and the established literature on the Honeymoon Effect is the difference between the 
closed league model in North America and the open league system in English soccer. To illustrate 
this point Figure 7 shows the average league rank before and after the opening of new stadium, 
from 15 years before opening (-15) to 18 years after. The figure in brackets for each tick on the x-
axis is the number of observations for that point in time. The y-axis measures the average rank of 
clubs with new stadiums – a smaller rank implies a better performance of the team. Three variants 
are shown on the chart: the solid line represents the set of 22 clubs for which we have attendance 
data for every season from -5 to +5 years after opening a new stadium. The line with longer dashes 
represents the average for 11 clubs for which we have data from -15 to +13 seasons. The shorter 
dashes refer to the complete dataset. In each case, there is a visible trend toward improved 
performance after the opening of a new stadium. For the larger sample, league rank improves by 
around six places in the first five seasons after opening (from rank 43 to 37). For the smaller 
balanced sample of 11 clubs, league rank improves by around twelve places (from rank 33 to 21). 
Twelve places is equivalent to around half a division, and therefore, depending on the initial 
position, is quite likely to involve promotion. There is also some evidence of improving league 
position in the run up to opening a new stadium. 
To compare this with the closed league model, we collected data on win percentage, 
attendance and stadium age for three of the major leagues teams (NFL, MLB, NBA) from 1988 to 
2016.11 Figure 8 shows the average win percentage before and after the opening of a new facility. 
The  
                                                             
11 Data sources: Rodney Fort's Sports Economics, https://www.baseball-reference.com/ , https://www.pro-football-
reference.com/, https://www.basketball-reference.com/ 
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average win percentage in the “before new stadium” period was 0.496 and in the “after new 
stadium” period was 0.503; the difference is not statistically significant, even at the 10% level. 
 
Figure 3-7: Average rank for clubs with new stadiums including number of observations in 
parentheses 
 
Figure 3-8: Average win percentage of Major League teams before and after opening a new 
stadium 
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More formally, Table 9 reports the result of the test of the hypothesis that team performance 
improved following the construction of a new stadium. We consider three different time horizons: 
five, ten or fifteen years, before and after the new stadium is built. We find that in professional 
English soccer we can reject the null hypothesis of no improvement, either measured by rank for 
any horizon, or measured by divisional status, except in the shortest period. By contrast, in the 
case of the major leagues, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no improvement of team 
performance, measured by win percentage, over each time horizon. 
 
  
Table 3-9: Change in team performance before and after opening a new stadium 
Major leagues
Period Before and after 
opening of new stadium
Rank 
difference
Division 
difference
Win percentage 
difference
t-5: t+5 6.82** 0.21 -0.007
(-2.01) (-1.48) (-0.60)
t-10: t+10 12.34*** 0.42*** 0.008
(-4.81) (-3.91) (-0.88)
t-15: t+15 17.26*** 0.65*** 0.007
(-7.58) (-6.66) (-1.02)
English soccer
(t-statistics in parentheses)  
 
While our account of the difference between North American leagues and English soccer may 
seem plausible, some caution is required given that there are many differences between North 
American leagues and the world of soccer. A good avenue for further research would be to 
compare effects in other leagues. A follow-up study to Feddersen et al (2006) on German soccer, 
taking advantage on the longer time period that has now elapsed, could help to decide if the effects 
identified here can be generalized to other soccer leagues. Likewise, it should be possible to 
conduct similar studies for national soccer leagues in countries such as France, Italy and Spain. 
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Research along these lines could help to establish not only whether new stadium effects are more 
enduring in the context of soccer leagues, but also whether this effect can reasonably be attributed 
to the system of promotion and relegation. Future studies also need to take into consideration the 
potential endogeneity between attendance and capacity and the likelihood that clubs building new 
stadiums are responding to increased demand.  
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3.8 Appendix  
 
Table 3-10: Appendix 1: Notes for Table 3 
Club Notes for table 3
Arsenal A subsidiary company Arsenal (Emirates Stadium) Limited was incorporated in 2000 to build and operate the stadium1
Bolton The stadium was built and operated by the parent company and the 1998 club's account quote the stadium's cost 30,101,525GBP  (47,780,198 in 
2015 prices)1  
Brighton The stadium is operated by a subsidiary company of B&H Holdings that in the 2011 accounts quoted the total project cost was 103million GBP1
Cardiff City The 2010 club accounts state that they (the club) "revalued the stadium to 44.6m on a replacement cost basis..." (p.17)1
Chester City Sold the previous stadium under new ownership and leased the new stadium from the council (based on 1992 accounts "Leasehold Property" in 
fixed assets)1
Colchester The stadium was built and owned by the council (council accounts 2008/09) who set up a company to manage the facility1
Coventry City Stadium built by public subsidiary (Coventry North Regeneration Limited) with additional property development1,2
Crawley Town Crawly were promoted to the 2nd division in 2011/2012 season, the stadium was built as a multipurpose facility2
Derby County The stadium was built by a holdings company affiliated with the team and has the same parent company1,2
Doncaster Rovers The stadium was built by the municipality amid the financial stress of the club, in 2012 the club took over operation of the facility from a 
municipal subsidiary2
Huddersfield Town Kirklees Stadium Development Limited was established to oversee, develop and manage the stadium that was also partially funded by the public 
sector and grants following the Taylor report1,2
Hull City The stadium was built by the city for both rugby and football (soccer) with money received from the city's share in a phone company1,2
Leicester City Privately built by Leciester City PLC, but after petition for administration stadium was owned by American Pension Fund Company (Loaned the 
money to the club)1,2
Manchester City The club is a subsidiary of City Football Group (established in 2013), the stadium was originally built for the Commonwealth Games by the 
council and national lottery (Sport England) and is now leased by the club who invested 20million GBP to expand capacity1,2
Middlesbrough The stadium was built as a response to the new requirements following the Taylor report and inability to change the old stadium to all-seating 
without substantial decrease in capacity2
Millwall Sold the old stadium to help finance the new one (1992 accounts) in addition to using grants (Taylor) and some local financing1,2
MK Dons The stadium was financed by the owner therefore details on the cost of the stadium are lacking2
Morecambe Invested in facility to introduce alternative income streams (2011 accounts)1
Northampton Town Previously played in a cricket ground, estimated cost is based on unofficial sources. More recent events including substantial public loans 
misappropriated by the developer overseeing renovations mar the stadium’s development2
Oxford The stadium was built by the club, made feasible after the club were bought by Kassam (owner)2
Reading Financed by the club who built a multipurpose facility partially financed by the development of the old facility2
Rotherham The stadium was financed by the owner (club) who owns the ultimate parent company and included a loan from the council at the excess of 
5million GBP1,2
Scunthorpe United Sold the old stadium and grounds (Old Show Ground) for 2.5 million GBP to fund the new one that cost 2.1 million. Despite general trends and 
obligations, Scunthorpe built stand-only stands2
Shrewsbury The stadium was eventually built after close to a ten year delay due to planning permits2
Southampton The stadium was financed by the club that took a loan from another holdings company (St. Mary's Stadium) with the same parent company1
Stoke City Originally partially owned by the council and club, the club bought the council's stakes in the stadium in  20072
Sunderland In the 1997 accounts the cost was estimated at 500GBP per seat (500*41600=20,800,000) but other estimates were lower (14million)1
Swansea City The cost of the project was 41.82 based on a cabinet (March 3rd 2005) report but included development outside the facility as well. In 2018 
Swansea took full control signing a new lease agreement1
Walsall According to the 1988-1990 accounts, the club disposed of the old stadium and property (that was under freehold) and acquired the new stadium 
while leasing the property1,2
Wigan The owner (Whelan) financed the facility therefore the club accounts do not include the stadium investment2
Wycombe Wanderers Wycombe Wanderers used funds from the sale of the old ground to finance the new stadium1,2 
Yeovil Town According to the 1995 accounts, the property including the stadium is under freehold and partially financed by the sale of the old property. Since 
2006 the stadium's ownership was transferred to Huish Park Stadium Partnership Limited, owned by Yeovil Town's primary shareholder1
1. Cost estimates, reported costs and ownership are based on club or other financial accounts, as well as other official sources
2. Cost estimates and ownership are based on reported costs from other sources
84 
 
Table 3-11: Appendix 2: Attendance model including the lag variable, FE for only Tier 1 
and Tier 2, FE for only Tier 3 and Tier 4, including a difference-indifference variable  
FE with diff-in-diff 
and lag
Tobit with diff-in-
diff and lag
FE with diff-in-diff 
(Tier 1 and Tier 2)
FE with diff-in-diff 
and lag (Tier 1 and 
Tier 2)
FE with diff-in-diff 
(Tier 3 and Tier 4)
FE with diff-in-diff 
and lag (Tier 3 and 
Tier 4)
Rivals 50.51 42.65 -133 117 -166.6 -224.5**
(95.2) (87.4) (198.9) (143.4) (118.2) (103.6)
Tier 2 -3,137*** -3,209*** -4,622*** -2,598*** - -
(248.0) (228.9) (431.6) (321.3)
Tier 3 -3,836*** -3,934*** - - - -
(330.6) (305.2)
Tier 4 -3,516*** -3,620*** - - -433.3*** -6.269
(403.9) (372.4) (150.9) (141.2)
Wages 79.6 45.98 1,476*** 261.9 4,864*** 2,244***
(171.6) (158.1) (286.0) (211.6) (898.0) (812.6)
Promotion 1,688*** 1,708*** 955.0*** 2,394*** 381.2** 343.1**
(171.0) (157.8) (341.4) (252.5) (183.2) (160.6)
Relegation -699.1*** -689.9*** 1,534*** -1,415*** -56.3 -368.0***
(178.8) (164.2) (454.2) (348.2) (139.4) (126.5)
Champions League -370.5 -324.6 -1,176 -611.3 - -
(453.6) (418.5) (743.3) (535.2)
Other European -190.7 -212.3 -6.956 -165.2 - -
(257.9) (237.2) (417.9) (300.6)
GDHI per capita 0.0149 0.0136 0.112** 0.0327 -0.167 -0.0174
(0.030) (0.027) (0.052) (0.038) (0.106) (0.092)
Diff-in-diff 628.2 527.8 8,434*** 3,236*** 484.0 219.9
(1785.0) (1635.4) (1426.0) (1047.0) (1215.0) (1015.0)
Lag attendance 0.608*** 0.609*** - 0.638*** - 0.438***
(0.020) (0.018) - (0.026) - (0.046)
Constant 7,002*** 6,984*** 30,444*** 11,022*** 9,200*** 4,066*
(1632.0) (1500.0) (1956.0) (1615.0) (2354.0) (2097.0)
R^2 0.988 0.9672 0.983 0.9573 0.9649
Observations 1,336 1,336 801 801 535 529
Number of Clubs 96 96 68 68 75 75  
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Table 3-12: Appendix 3: Linear point estimates for stadium age and stadium age groups 
when including lag attendance and models including only Tiers 1 and 2, and only Tiers 3 
and 4 (Number of observations in parentheses) 
Age (obs) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 (21) 14685*** 9594*** 3700*** 1468 2535* 14666*** 9329*** 3768*** 1450* 2457*
2 (24) 5706*** 3294*** -275 104 1529 5518*** 3087*** -196 91 1459
3 (26) 3758*** 3215*** 2369*** 314 1840 3539*** 3029*** 2460*** 273 1753
4 (26) 4852*** 2285*** 1503** 76 1796 4636*** 2080*** 1580*** 59 1732
5 (26) 4966*** 2022** 2036*** -658 1937 4754*** 1763** 2099*** -694 1860
6 (25) 2457** 1291 1680** 972 -1386 2256** 1098 1746*** 956 -1416
7 (26) 1406 358 1976*** 1677 503 1231 52 2031*** 1645 497
8 (26) 4289*** 2570*** 2413*** 1724 874 4145*** 2347*** 2482*** 1684 851
9 (25) 4365*** 3127*** 1404* 1257 1391 4151*** 2821*** 1465** 1205 1435
10 (23) 3358** 3741*** 673 1757 585 3178** 3499*** 729 1718 607
11 (21) 7138*** 2796*** 758 1900 1217 6905*** 2464*** 827 1860 1248
12 (19) 2040 3125*** 1878** 1992 -283 1800 2799*** 1932*** 1951 541
13 (20) 3584* 2941*** 452 1025 839 3402** 2597*** 510 957 934
14 (21) 3702** 2383** 1526* 1056 155 3518** 1996* 1594** 986 259
15 (18) 2673 3503* 1711** 1178 696 2457 3232* 1758** 1140 805
16 (16) 4256** -962 766 1258 243 4053** -1193 829 1200 324
17 (16) 4264** 2527* 748 1727 1142 4062** 2278* 813 1669* 1250
18 (14) 6046*** -2359* 1789* 390 170 5841*** -2605** 1832* 309 250
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1-5 (123) 7661*** 4228*** 2127*** 529 1796* 7467*** 3991*** 2206*** 507 1711*
6-10 (125) 3926*** 2569*** 1970*** 1488* 728 3734*** 2301*** 2036*** 1439* 730
11-15 (99) 4949*** 3442*** 1589*** 1252 647 4717*** 3076*** 1653*** 1176 983
16+ (46) 6011*** -225 1424** 1145* 761 5791*** -491 1485** 1062* 921
FE with diff-in-diff and lag (constrained) Tobit with diff-in-diff and lag (constrained)
FE with diff-in-diff and lag Tobit with diff-in-diff and lag
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Age (obs) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 (21) 11932*** 7925*** 4309*** 11932*** 11932*** 15301*** 9640*** 4482*** 15301*** 15301***
2 (24) 13387*** 7178*** 577 13387*** 13387*** 5555*** 2663*** -2521* 5555*** 5555***
3 (26) 11468*** 7626*** 4078* 2769 11468*** 3617*** 2795*** 3955*** 702 3617***
4 (26) 12421*** 6621*** 2702* 12421*** 12421*** 4827*** 1518 1525 4827*** 4827***
5 (26) 12601*** 5672*** 3039** 12601*** 12601*** 4741*** 1800* 2298** 4741*** 4741***
6 (25) 9516*** 4406*** 2467* 9516*** 9516*** 2333* 1009 1783* 2333* 2333*
7 (26) 6918*** 3753** 2259* 6918*** 6918*** 1454 -275 1803* 1454 1454
8 (26) 7822*** 4653*** 3141** 7822*** 7822*** 4063*** 2346** 2269** 4063*** 4063***
9 (25) 8186*** 5721*** 2542* 8186*** 8186*** 4191*** 2061 1313 4191*** 4191***
10 (23) 5796** 6228*** 1978 5796** 13643*** 3423** 3255** 728 3423** 4578
11 (21) 10031*** 5586*** 1185 10031*** 10031*** 6936*** 2148* 871 6936*** 6936***
12 (19) 8271*** 6021*** 1405 8271*** 11445** 2010 2761** 1827* 2010 2820
13 (20) 9403*** 6472*** 1535 8502* 9403*** 3677* 2541** 902 2565 3677*
14 (21) 9439*** 6065*** 3371** 9439*** 9439*** 3633* 2048 2241* 3633* 3633*
15 (18) 8591*** 6908** 2984* 8591*** 8591*** 2934 3240 1600 2934 2934
16 (16) 9658*** -5 1918 9658*** 9658*** 4207* -1566 308 4207* 4207*
17 (16) 10485*** 1966 1719 10485*** 10485*** 4470** 2365 394 4470** 4470**
18 (14) 12404*** -2098 2318 2723 12404*** 5996*** -2856* 1537 801 5996***
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1-5 (123) 12396*** 6917*** 3045*** 2901 12396*** 7956*** 3890*** 2430*** 1254 7956***
6-10 (125) 7822*** 4816*** 2434** 7822*** 11382*** 3987*** 2159*** 1835** 3987*** 7059**
11-15 (99) 9188*** 6034*** 1819* 6520* 9188*** 5121*** 3095*** 1654** 4763 5121***
16+ (46) 10912*** -537 1670 2736 10912*** 6223*** -655 805 1583 6223***
FE with diff-in-diff (Tier 1 and Tier 2) FE with diff-in-diff and lag (Tier 1 and Tier 2)
FE with diff-in-diff (Tier 1 and Tier 2) (constrained) FE with diff-in-diff and lag (Tier 1 and Tier 2) 
(constrained)
 
Age (obs) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 (21) 4 4 1555** 1737*** 4 560 560 801 1872*** 560
2 (24) 296 296 1665** 1623** 296 129 129 -68 1059* 129
3 (26) 271 271 2994*** 866 271 149 149 1302** 657 149
4 (26) -295 -295 1882** 820 -295 -63 -63 366 684 -63
5 (26) -202 -202 1433* 329 -202 131 131 -27 -49 131
6 (25) 836 836 700 -8 836 433 433 -390 797 433
7 (26) 807 807 1931** 732 807 447 447 962 1019 447
8 (26) 943 943 5475*** 1482 943 536 536 3418*** 1006 536
9 (25) -236 -236 -236 607 1316 986 986 986 166 959
10 (23) 1344 1344 1344 867 1344 948 948 948 603 948
11 (21) 1666** 1666** 1666** 1651 1666** 941 941 941 1294 941
12 (19) 732 732 4170** 2215** 732 637 637 1507 1657 637
13 (20) 1303 1303 1549 1539 1303 899 899 -1699 691 899
14 (21) 1070 1070 1176 416 1070 590 590 -591 -167 590
15 (18) 1285 1285 2437** 1313 1285 817 817 969 806 817
16 (16) 910 910 4726*** 2143*** 910 572 572 1986 1211* 572
17 (16) 1235 1235 4748*** 2783*** 1235 966 966 1366 1686*** 966
18 (14) 755 755 4457*** 690 755 575 575 1064 173 575
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1-5 (123) 419 419 2122*** 1375*** 419 398 398 648 1096*** 398
6-10 (125) 1159** 1159** 2040*** 843 1159** 773* 773* 904 905* 773*
11-15 (99) 1228** 1228** 1290 1374** 1228** 731 731 -141 911* 731
16+ (46) 1044* 1044* 3707*** 1597*** 1044* 766 766 1407 883** 766
FE with diff-in-diff (Tier 3 and Tier 4) (constrained) FE with diff-in-diff and lag (Tier 3 and Tier 4) 
(constrained)
FE with diff-in-diff (Tier 3 and Tier 4) FE with diff-in-diff and lag (Tier 3 and Tier 4)
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 The Public Finance Debate: Sport Venue Finance, Municipal 
Capitalism and Public Goods 
 
 
Abstract: 
North American cities continue to invest municipal capital or allocate publicly owned land for 
sport facilities despite the criticism regarding the scale of the public regional benefits. This paper 
posits that a public goods approach to explain the allure of allocating resources has not been 
successful in predicting behavior. Building towards the presentation of an alternative theoretical 
perspective, this paper reviews the past research relative to public investments in sport venues. I 
identify how previous studies discussed and attempted to understand the rationale behind publicly 
financed facilities. A traditional framework that focuses on public and merit goods  maybe less 
valuable in understanding the actions of governments as a result of (1)  the monopolized structure 
of North American professional sport and (2) the increasing intra-regional competition for 
economic activity resulting from the absence of tax-base sharing programs. As a result, a focus on 
municipal capitalism provides a more useful paradigm to explain what is taking place and how 
best to evaluate the policy choices confronting cities. Public goods theory provides some necessary 
insights but in the current environment, it is far more likely that the costs to maintain or attract a 
franchise stem from entrepreneurial agendas rather than the provision of (local) public goods. 
Future analysis of stadium finance should therefore focus on municipal capitalism and urban 
entrepreneurialism rather than examine these projects from a neoclassical public finance 
theoretical approach. 
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4.1 Introduction 
North American cities continue to spend municipal capital or allocate publicly owned land for 
sport facilities primarily used by the private sector. These expenditures persist despite the criticism 
voiced in the academic literature regarding the regional benefits for the public sector from these 
incentives (Delaney & Eckstein, 2007). From a theoretical perspective, governments should invest 
in those assets and activities that produce public or merit goods. The on-going interest in public 
sector investments to secure a team’s presence could suggest to some that civic leaders are ignoring 
the classical framework for allocating who gets what (Key, 1940), and the traditional definition of 
public goods and public finance (Samuelson, 1954; Musgrave, 1959). This paper, however, posits 
that a public goods approach to understanding the theory behind governments’ on-going spending 
to build homes for professional teams is inappropriate. A theoretical framework anchored by 
municipal capitalism (whereby the public sector is more of an “active capitalist” (Chapin, 2002)) 
and urban entrepreneurialism concepts could well be more helpful in predicting and explaining the 
on-going investment patterns by governments. 
Building towards the presentation of an alternative theoretical perspective, this paper 
reviews the past research relative to public investments in sport venues. Pre development formative 
studies focus primarily on decision-making processes to understand the extent to which the public 
or elites are involved and controlling the investment decision. Post-hoc analyses usually compare 
outcomes with initial proposals in an effort to understand returns to the public sector. Both analyses 
rely on economic, urban development, and governance theories and either refute or acknowledge 
the justifications used by public stadium finance proponents. From these two groups of 
assessments of sport venue development, two theories of particular interest to this paper have 
emerged. The first is the neo-classical public goods theory anchored to the seminal work of 
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Samuelson (1954) and Musgrave (1959). As opposed to public goods, researchers less explicitly 
discuss the second theory, municipal capitalism and entrepreneurship, despite its relevancy 
(Chapin 2002). It may well be that both are instructive and useful; however, my interest is in 
finding a theoretical framework that is more helpful in explaining why civic leaders continue to 
allocate resources for privately used sport facilities. I proceed from the point that public and civic 
leaders understand the criticism of these investments that produce minimal regional economic 
growth, and the victimization of the public sector because of the cartel structure of the sport 
leagues. The persistent investments by the public sector if one adheres to public goods theory 
would suggest that only elite control perspectives explain the on-going investments. I argue that a 
focus on municipal capitalism provides a critical framework from which to understand the use of 
public dollars for professional sport venues.   
The empirical part of the research is an analysis of 116 previous studies that discussed 
professional sport facility development. The papers examined include econometric studies, 
stakeholder analyses, contingent valuation methods, theoretical models, text analyses and other 
research methods mentioned in the following sections. I categorized the studies to distinguish 
between those that explicitly discuss public goods and those related to the recent interest in using 
the concepts of municipal capitalism and entrepreneurship. These perspectives are utilized to 
explore the enhanced value of using municipal capitalization as a perspective to understand the 
allocations made by the public sector. Through this review, I identify how previous studies 
discussed and attempted to understand the rationale behind publicly financed facilities. In 
summary, my goal is to provide a different theoretical framework for future assessments of public 
investment in the facilities used by professional teams. I do not suggest that public finance is 
justified given the current monopolized structure of North American professional sport, but rather 
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seek to explore rational responses within a non-market situation. That response, usually assessed 
from a public goods perspective is not meaningful given the market conditions that confront cities 
for a privately produced product with both externalities and intrinsic value for a society.  
 The paper is divided into seven sections Section II is a brief review of public goods and 
urban entrepreneurialism. Section III outlines the methodology. Section IV is the analysis of the 
116 peer-reviewed papers. Section V summarizes the findings on stadium finance and the two 
main theories discussed in this research. Section VI reviews recent sport facility finance and 
categorization. Section VII presents final observations and suggestions for future research.  
 
4.2 Public Goods and Municipal Capitalism theories   
The neoclassical public goods (Samuelson, 1954) and more recent entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 
1989) theories discuss different public finance rationales in an attempt to clarify how best to 
allocate the public sector’s resources in contrast to the uses of private capital. I outline and 
elaborate on the theories in this section, but it is important to distinguish the differences between 
the two. Broadly, the public goods approach proposed an explicit framework that determines the 
appropriate conditions for the use of public funds for either those goods and services that while 
beneficial or valuable were unlikely to be produced at satisfactory levels by the private sector.  The 
resulting market failure leads to a real welfare loss Merit goods are those that could be produced 
by the private sector, but a society deems would lead to less welfare  or biased distribution patterns 
either of which is an undesired outcome. In contrast, a focus on municipal capitalism and civic 
entrepreneurialism (market-based activities performed by the public sector) focuses on the public 
sector’s pursuit of (1) human and economic capital for a particular region or city that is competition 
with other regions or cities and (2) the redistribution of regional economic activity to correct fiscal 
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and social imbalances. In pursuit of either of these two objectives, the public sector adopts 
business-like investment and development approaches complementing their other responsibilities 
for the provision or production of desired levels of merit goods.  
4.2.1 Public goods 
Public goods theory was formulated to illustrate why market failure exists and reduced welfare 
levels that without collective action societal welfare levels decrease. Anchoring this perspective 
are two fundamental perspectives regarding the nature of goods and services for which 
consumption is rival and for where exclusion is possible will be produced by the private sector 
(Samuelson, 1954). What the government should produce or provide then should be defined or 
limited to those goods and services that do not meet these criteria. In the absence of collective 
action an undersupply will result (Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986). This likelihood suggests 
that the public sector assumes the financier role if the product is considered as a public good.  
 Pure public goods are a rarity. Samuelson’s (1954) theory of public goods is highly 
restrictive (Buchanan, 1999). Additionally, the original theory focused on central government 
activities, and not on local governments that provide many of the goods and services that residents 
rely upon for their daily lives (Tiebout, 1956). Various extensions to the public goods theory 
include Buchanan’s (1965) ‘club goods’ theory and local club goods (Stiglitz, 1977). Club goods 
as opposed to public goods are those goods and services that have some publicness, but for which 
exclusion may exist. One of the distinctions in public goods theory was the contextualization of 
the theory to the local market. So rather than discussing pure public goods, some attention was 
devoted to local public goods that are provided locally with benefits confined to a specific space 
aligning with pre-determined spatial boundaries. People will choose to live in a community based 
on their public goods preferences and live with people with similar tastes, given an optimal amount 
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of communities and hence their location defines the boundaries of the club (Batina & Ihori, 2005). 
One example of a local club good is non-exclusionary open spaces that the private sector are likely 
to underprovide but are viewed as a desired commodity in cities (Geoghegan, 2002) and which are 
available only to residents of a particular city or neighborhood.  
 Musgrave and Musgrave’s (1989) discussion of merit goods broadened the theory of public 
goods. A government, reflecting on inequities or undesirable distributional patterns, could consider 
providing other goods that are not necessarily pure public goods. These exceptions had special 
merit but actually made it possible for different communities to offer more, or less services, 
depending on local perspectives of merit. In some ways, the inclusion of merit goods into the 
framework created a situation that was more similar to what Tiebout (1956) envisioned. Public 
choice theory envisioned local governments differentiated themselves by the mix of goods and 
services provided, and the taxes (prices) charged for a particular combination of available goods 
and services.   
There are scholars who suggested that local public goods, as opposed to pure public goods, 
are non-exclusionary but may be characterized as examples of rival consumption as a result of 
mismatches between demand and supply (Bergstrom & Goodman, 1973; Oates, 1988). This is 
before the issue of boundaries is introduced resulting in demand for the quality of services from 
residents of one community that does not have sufficient wealth to produce the level of services 
available in an adjoining community. Either way, in both the local and national context despite the 
optimality of public goods, the provision of public goods is not exempt of self-interest behavior, 
“free riders,” and equity issues (Kim & Walker, 1984). Local public goods supplied and paid for 
by one district in a decentralized system cannot prevent people from other districts consuming the 
public goods and enjoying spillovers without paying (Besley & Coate, 2003). Similarly, there are 
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goods that should not be denied to residents of other cities. Equity issues also arise when different 
levels of local public good are available to different sets of citizens based on the residential 
properties they can afford (Anas, Arnott & Small, 1988). Governments cannot avoid “free riding” 
because of the non-exclusionary nature of the goods, nor should they be able to exclude those from 
areas that have less access to the revenues needed to produce goods and services.  
4.2.2 Municipal capitalism and urban entrepreneurialism  
Local governments once focused only on urban managerialism which meant providing services 
designed to maximize residents’ social welfare. That singular focus shifted to include a more 
entrepreneurial approach a result of decentralization patterns (Lauermann, 2018). These shifts 
were most noticeable as cities transitioned from the industrial to the post-industrial era (Doucet, 
2013). Local leaders faced increasing inter-city competition for revenue and economic activity 
because of federal budget cuts, increased demand for social amenities, redistribution of economic 
activities outside core cities, and the increased mobility of industries (Cox. 1995; Healey, 1998 ;
Weber, 2003, Ederington et al., 2005). In order to accommodate these changes and respond to 
increased regional competition in the midst of changing economic conditions, cities adopted 
entrepreneurial and business-like approaches to urban governance and development (Harvey 
1989). Cities traditionally sought to create better and more appealing living and work 
environments but the changes in governance included an increased attention to development and 
partnerships with the private sector and a diminished importance of local provision of welfare 
(Hall & Hubbard, 1996 ;Hubbard, 1996).  
Researchers interpret urban entrepreneurialism and municipal capitalism in several ways 
and do not have a definitive definition but rather describe the changes that local governments 
experienced in response to the changing structure of economies and a need focus on revenue 
94 
 
enhancement (Leitner, & Garner, 1993; McGuirk, & MacLaran, 2001). Because of the diverse 
interpretations of urban entrepreneurialism as part of local politics and policy-making, analyses of 
what portray successful entrepreneurial cities are also diverse (Cox, 1991; Boyle, 2011). It is 
apparent from a collective reading of previous studies that public officials were inclined to focus 
their attention on investment in city branding projects, operating a government more like a 
business, and encourage private investment (Box 1999). In order to encourage private investment, 
cities became more likely to provide the private sector with greater incentives and public resources 
to attract human and physical capital and increase local revenues from taxation and civic 
“boosterism” (Britton, 1991; Stoked, 2007). In the following paragraphs, I refer to municipal 
capitalism and urban entrepreneurialism in the same context as they both address the 
aforementioned structural shifts in governance and fiscal capital relevant for this study. Table 1 
broadly summarizes and compares the two theories and in the last row mentions the possible 
relationships between the theories and sport facility development that I will revisit later on in the 
paper.     
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Table 4-1: Comparison between public goods and municipal capitalism theories 
Theory Public goods Municipal capitalism and 
entrepreneurialism 
Objective The provision of public goods 
and use of public funds and 
taxation 
Inter-city competition and attract capital 
Theoretical 
framework 
Non exclusionary and non 
rivalrous goods that fit the criteria 
for public expenditure  
Public sector business-like approach and 
governance modes with increased 
diversified development agendas to boost 
local revenues   
General 
analysis 
Categorizing Public vs Private 
goods and different types of 
goods and government levels 
Governance shifts and analyzing the 
implementation of objectives set by 
public/private partnerships 
Outcome Public capital depends on market 
conditions and necessities  
Manifestation depends on aggregate 
tangible and/or intangible outcomes and 
the governance mechanisms    
Conclusion in 
relation to 
sport 
investment 
Public facility and presence of a 
franchise as a public good that 
could justify public incentives 
Capital investment in a facility as a 
growth mechanism and social amenities 
such as civic pride 
 
Of the two theories, I argue that it is likelier that an investment in a sport facility is an example 
of an entrepreneurial approach rather than a necessary expense responding to a market failure. 
There is the other important distinction between the categorization of the facility and the franchise. 
It is apparent that any reference to public goods in the sport industry addresses the franchise rather 
than the facility itself. Whereas the entrepreneurial approach could also discuss the amenities of 
the facility regardless of the presence of a franchise.    
4.3 Methodology 
The review previous studies discussing sport venue finance makes it possible to present a brief 
empirical descriptive analysis of recent trends in the development and financing of new facilities. 
I collected the literature by searching for studies discussing sport facility development and finance 
in leading journals and general search engines. My analysis includes 116 peer-reviewed studies 
from economic, urban studies, law and other social science journals. The studies included those 
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where the conclusions address publicly financed professional sport facilities or the study explicitly 
mentioned it as one of the primary subjects discussed in the paper. While some papers may not be 
included, I surveyed the references in various papers in order to identify missing literature that 
may be relevant and that was not identified during the initial search. I categorized the studies based 
on their research focus, primary theories, research methods, unit of analysis, and if they referenced 
public goods. I base my categorization roughly on previous text analyses such as the one used by 
Borland and Macdonald (2003). I focus on the references in the literature associated with the public 
goods and municipal capitalism theories. Ultimately, the analysis reveals how previous studies 
addressed the financing predicament and how sport development studies can be categorized into 
three hypothesized primary groups that include within sub groups (Figure 1): 
Figure 4-1: The three sport venue finance analysis categories 
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The dashed lines in Figure 1 represent the relationship between studies that discuss public goods 
and municipal capitalism within a political analysis framework such as stakeholder analyses. In 
the discussion section I include a review of recent sport facility developments to portray some of 
the arguments made throughout the study and emphasize the importance of this data as public 
subsidies persist despite the criticism. Data was collected on all the existing facilities in the four 
major leagues, Major League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL). I then summarized the 
facility financing plans since 2010 using official public records. Finally, using some of the 
examples from recent projects, I portray the proposed analysis process distinguishing between 
public goods definitions and municipal capitalism.  
4.4 Sport Facility Finance Analyses 
Each of the 116 studies analyzed the public finance predicament created from governments 
providing some or all of the funding for a venue used by professional teams (Noll, 1974). A 
detailed list of the papers appears in Appendix 1. These studies used different quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. Most of the studies concluded that there is no tangible economic 
impact justification for the public sector to finance the venues used by professional franchises (e.g.  
Baade, 1996; Crompton, 2006; Propheter, 2012). That is not to suggest there is no impact (Feng 
and Humphreys, 2018), but it remains to be determined if that impact, tangible or intangible, is 
sufficient to justify the commitment of tax money (Dolan, et al 2016). Cities that want to maintain 
“major league” status are occasionally faced with franchises threating to leave if they do not 
receive public incentives, but the proponents often use assessed economic impact benefits to justify 
the public costs. Maintaining their monopoly limiting the number of franchises, leagues and 
owners continue to demand public incentives (Rosentraub, 1997). The monopoly creates an under 
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provision and “market-failure” (Williamson, 1972) that empowers franchises bargaining for public 
incentives.   
The most common quantitative empirical studies analyzed the extent of regional and local 
economic impacts including employment, income and population changes after facilities were 
built (Figure 2). The analyses primarily reveal that the impacts insufficiently compensate for the 
costs (Rosentraub, et al., 1994). New facilities can relocate employment and development within 
the region (Rosentraub, 2006) but are unlikely to spur new growth and are often just substitutes 
(Baade, 1996). Other impact studies focused particularly on the real estate and development 
patterns ensuing sport facility development. These studies examine property values and actual 
development that occurred during and after cities financed sport facilities. Impact studies examine 
what took place after the facility opened. There were several studies that looked at the scale of new 
development and the resulting shift in taxes and other revenue streams that might benefit a host 
communities (Coates, 2007; Humphreys & Zhou, 2015). Several studies also empirically analyzed 
referendums and willingness to pay using different methodologies and theories including CVM 
analyses (i.e. Johnson et al. 2012). Those studies looking at decision processes noted that if a 
referendum or publicly elected body approved the financing of a venue then there was a tacit 
endorsement in the investment of tax dollars (Mason & Buist, 2013; Johnson & Hall, 2019). 
However as several studies revealed, referendums are often based on biased information relayed 
to the public and in some instances when the referendum failed to pass the public sector found 
alternative methods to publicly finance the facilities (Fort, 1997).  
 
Figure 4-2: General topics based on type of analysis 
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The distribution between qualitative and quantitative empirical analyses is fairly even and 
the most studied topic is the economic impact of sport facilities (Figure 3). Quantitative analyses 
used different models and study units to examine the impact sport facilities had on local markets 
and regions, attendance and willingness to pay and voting. The majority of the quantitative 
research studied North American case studies but some analyses focused on European markets 
such as England and Germany and elsewhere. The attendance models primarily used ordinary least 
squared (OLS) and fixed effect demand models. Attendance analyses sought to examine the 
duration of the effect a new facility has on attendance. The purpose of these studies was to examine 
the argument that new facilities increase attendance and consequently economic activity around 
the facility (Baade, & Tiehen, 1990; Gitter & Rhoads, 2014). Quantitative economic impact 
analyses used hedonic models to examine real estate value increases related to the facility, OLS 
models examining income, multipliers, cost-benefit analyses, and actual construction (e.g. Hefner, 
1990; Nelson, 2002; Hudson, 2003; Propheter, 2012 & 2017). Researchers quantitatively 
examining willingness-to-pay used CVM methodologies and surveys in order to examine the 
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amount people are willing to pay for a new facility and if those accumulated amounts compensate 
for the actual costs (Coates & Humphreys, 2003; Johnson, Mondello & Whitehead, 2007; Porter 
& Thomas, 2010). Other studies focused on referendums using polling station data (Johnson & 
Hall, 2019).      
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Figure 4-3: Methodologies and theories 
 
 
The qualitative studies often discuss economic impacts and financing mechanisms, but they 
also provide insights on governance and stakeholder analyses (Rosentraub & Swindell, 2002; 
Saito, 2018; Sant & Mason, 2019). These studies analyze the dynamics between different 
stakeholders and are particularly interested in the influential role of the private sector. Most 
commonly, the arguments draw attention to the private sector’s ability to secure deals that directly 
favor the private sector and cannot guarantee tangible public benefits (Collins, 2008). Qualitative 
studies of stadium finance included interviews, document analyses and narratives, analysis of the 
laws and hearings, and descriptive statistics. The data collected in these studies strengthen the 
arguments appearing in the quantitative analyses but also provide other perspectives that were 
rarely included in the quantitative analyses, particularly, focusing on the role of the different 
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stakeholders in the process (Crompton, Howard & Var, 2003; Delaney & Eckstein, 2003; Collins 
& Grineski, 2007).    
Figure 4 categorizes the conclusions from the 116 studies divided by the type of analysis 
described in the previous figures. Most studies concluded that there is no economic justification 
for the investment in sport facilities, and if there is an impact then it insufficiently compensates 
for the costs (Figure 4). There are a few studies that suggest that intangible benefits may 
compensate for the costs and argue that some projects may have meaningful societal or cultural 
benefits that could explain the costs but not necessarily justify them while leagues operate as they 
do (Rappaport & Wilkerson, 2001; Owen, 2006). The quantitative studies rely on the fact that there 
is no empirical evidence that sport facilities are associated with growth more so than other places 
may have experienced. They also emphasize the alternatives uses of funds used for the facilities. 
Conclusions also addressed that expenditure on sport by consumers may just substitute other 
activities rather than incur new expenses that would otherwise not be made. Conclusions in 
qualitative studies often point to the flaws in the system that allows the monopolized structures of 
the league. Other qualitative studies point to the governance dynamics that enable franchise owners 
to use the threat of relocation to obtain what the research argues, are unjustified expenses. A few 
studies argue that intangible benefits or externalities make a feasible argument to invest in sport 
facilities. The largest group are the studies that reject arguments that sport facility public finance 
is justified and creates benefits that compensate for the costs.        
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Figure 4-4: Conclusion categories 
 
 
The focus of my study was the reference of public goods and urban entrepreneurialism in the 
sport literature. Of the 116 papers examined, 27 mention public goods in different contexts and 
different types of analyses. The primary difference is that some studies mention public goods in 
the background. In other studies, the public goods argument was part of a descriptive approach to 
examine public finance, but the majority of the studies focused on the production of public goods. 
Most studies examining the production of public goods used the CVM approach to analyze if the 
monetary impact of the public goods is greater than the investment. A broader discussion on 
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whether or not the public sector should even consider public expenditure is less apparent (Baade 
& Matheson, 2006).  
 
4.5 Public goods, municipal capitalism and sport finance  
I propose that a more adequate theory to examine public expenditure is the response of cities to 
the economic transition from manufacturing and the reliance on comparative advantages to a 
service-based economy capitalizing on competitive advantages.  The focus for cities was on 
creating the environments that would attract and retain the human capital that helped service-
related firms needed.  This reality led to a focus for on entrepreneurial agendas. For example, with 
the younger entrepreneurs attracted to vibrant downtown areas with emerging residential and urban 
entertainment characters, cities increased public incentives and land allocations to the private 
sector (Leitner, & Garner, 1993). I address both theories in relation to sport development and 
finance. It is important to make the distinction between the venue itself and the franchises that play 
in the facility. The facilities require tickets to enter events and have limited capacity; hence, they 
are exclusionary and rival consumption is taking place. Additionally, the only reason there may be 
a market-failure is that the professional sport monopolies create it by limiting the number of 
franchises. In several studies, researchers assessed the notion that sport facilities or rather the 
franchises produce public goods such as civic pride (Groothuis, & Rotthoff, 2016). Civic pride is 
non-exclusionary and consumption is not rival but the private sector can produce those goods like 
other privately produced public goods (Bergstrom, Blume, & Varian, 1986). Either way, studies 
reached the conclusion that even the produced public goods do not financially justify the public 
expenditure. I will further address this matter in the conclusions, but I do not imply that public 
goods are irrelevant. I do propose that the focus in sport literature should perhaps address different 
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theories rather than public goods in an attempt to understand the reasons cities use public capital 
on privately used facilities despite the criticism.  
4.5.1 Public goods and professional sport 
“In a private ownership economy, private goods are purchased by consumers in private 
markets; public goods are purchased in private markets and provided to the consumers by 
the special economic agent – the government. This agent has, therefore, two basic tasks to 
perform. First, it must choose the quantity of each of the K public goods it will purchase 
and provide the consumers. Second, it must raise, through taxes, the necessary funds to 
finance its purchases of the public goods. In order to carry out these tasks in a socially 
desirable or non-arbitrary manner, the government will have to communicate with the 
consumers.” (Groves and Ledyard, 1977, P.786) 
 Several studies explicitly discuss sport finance and public goods or the production of public 
goods. The production of public goods in sport literature is an attempt to define the outcome of a 
commodity provided by the public associated with the development of a product that in itself is 
not a public good. The facility itself is either a pure private good or possibly a club good, the 
products it offer can be sustained through admissions (exclusion) and consumption is mostly rival 
(even if one argues that within the venue there is rival consumption). One might concede events 
are club goods (Buchanan 1965; Sandler & Tschirhart, 1997). While the facility is clearly not a 
public good, the franchises that play there can produce some externalities for which exclusion is 
not possible and in which there is non-rival consumption (Groothuis, Johnson, & Whitehead, 
2004). Franchises of course require facilities to play. Using public goods theories to discuss 
stadium finance raises two issues. First, are the externalities enough to justify the public 
expenditure or an inappropriate use of public capital for a product that is arguably a private one? 
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Second, the externalities are not geographically limited while the public sources used to pay for 
the facilities (or rather, to maintain or attract a franchise) are constrained by governmental 
jurisdiction or taxable zones. Hence, it is impossible to prevent the “free-rider” problem and 
prevent people from enjoying the externalities without having to pay for the facility (Mules, 1998; 
Owen, 2003).  
If people prefer not to pay for the facility or perceive there are no immediate benefits 
associated with local public goods (a sport facility that could be associated with the provision of 
some form of public services such as property increase) voters could vote against a referendum. 
Alternatively, voters could also potentially move to a different location if they prefer that the public 
sector where they live does not use their tax payments for financing a sport facility (Dehring, 
Depken II, & Ward, 2008). However, there is no research as of yet that examined if people actually 
left a city where taxation in some form was used to pay for a facility. It is hard to believe that the 
marginal increase in taxation would be enough to cause mass exodus, unless it was part of wider 
escalation in taxation or substantial change in the tax-service bundles and provision of local public 
goods (Tiebout, 1956; Dowding, John, & Biggs, 1994; Marsh & Kay, 2006). It is a hard case to 
make that the facility or franchise are a public good, and even the production of public goods can 
be provided by the private sector. It is also hard to imagine that franchises would not build facilities 
if governments refused to provide public incentives or directly pay for facilities, or if regulations 
would limit the possible uses of public resources and tax benefits on issued bonds. Currently, 
franchises use the relocation threat to secure public incentives and cities comply if they want to 
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avoid the possibility of losing a franchise or fail to attract one. Why do cities care so much about 
having a franchise, what do they hope to gain or avoid losing?   
4.5.2 Municipal capitalism and entrepreneurialism, and professional sport 
“Put simply, the "managerial" approach so typical of the 1960s has steadily given way to 
initiatory and "entrepreneurial" forms of action in the 1970s and 1980s. In recent years in 
particular, there seems to be a general consensus emerging throughout the advanced 
capitalist world that positive benefits are to be had by cities taking an entrepreneurial stance 
to economic development. What is remarkable, is that this consensus seems to hold across 
national boundaries and even across political parties and ideologies.” (Harvey, 1989, P.4) 
The entrepreneurial city is a prescriptive theory of urban development and governance comprised 
of three defining features (Jessop and Sum, 2000): 
1. Economically well-performing entrepreneurial cities that pursue innovative strategies to 
maintain or enhance competitiveness  
2. Explicitly formulated reflexive strategies pursued in an active, entrepreneurial fashion. 
Cities can be said to act in a relatively unified and strategic manner and/or in which specific 
social forces are able to define the interests of the city and be seen to act for and on behalf 
of the latter. 
3. Less successful cities that explicitly adopt and define themselves as entrepreneurial urban 
regimes   
Chapin (2002) explicitly discussed municipal capitalism and San Diego’s attempts to invigorate 
downtown development including a baseball ballpark, and suggested that future research should 
further examine sport and municipal capitalism. There does not appear to be another explicit study 
on sport and municipal capitalism and municipal entrepreneurialism in the literature. However, if 
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I review the three features of the entrepreneurial city then it appears that several sport development 
studies implicitly addressed them. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact measures that differentiate 
between entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial cities, other than noticing a clearer agenda to 
attract development using public incentives and cities adopting a business-like approach. If I go 
ahead with the somewhat quasi definition of municipal capitalism and entrepreneurialism that is 
relatable to sport development literature then I can identify some relationship between sport 
development and the entrepreneurial city. First, a number of the larger cities provided public 
incentives or were directly involved in financing facilities. It is generally impossible to tell if North 
American cities would provide these incentives if franchises could not threaten to leave or expect 
incentives if they were to relocate. There is evidence of cities outside of North America that also 
financed sport facilities used by professional franchises despite the somewhat more free market in 
different leagues (Jones, 2002). Hence, the public sector still occasionally invests in sports 
facilities. However, there is stronger evidence of teams that privately financed their facilities. 
Secondly, some cities that contributed to sport facilities outlined clear agendas and strategies they 
believed will achieve development and revenue generating goals. These goals either targeted 
development nearby the facility or hoped to attract new economic activity and consumers 
(Rosentraub, et al., 1994; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2006; Cantor & Rosentraub, 2012). Third, a 
number of cities that can be defined as fiscally weaker opted to provide some public incentives for 
sport facilities, hoping that keeping or attracting the franchise is one of the components to increase 
or at the least maintain some appeal to the city (Chapin, 2004; Rosentraub, 2009). Those cities on 
some occasions also hoped that building the facility in a certain location would stimulate growth 
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and development around the facility. The question however remains, did cities that appear to match 
one or more of the three features actually achieve what they set out to achieve? 
Figure 5 depicts my findings on the relationship between public goods, municipal 
capitalism, and entrepreneurialism, and publicly financed facilities. First, I make a distinction 
between the two theories and then the two main components that differentiate between the facility 
and the franchise. I suggest municipal capitalism may be more adequate in light of local urban 
governance changes since the 1980s but public goods is still an important critique in light of the 
current monopolistic circumstances.  
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Figure 4-5: Public goods, municipal capitalism, and sport finance analysis flowchart 
    
 
I believe it is difficult to make the argument that the neoclassical public goods theories 
considered sport facilities as worthy or examples of goods and services that should be paid for by 
the public sector. Public finance theorists were determining what justifies the use of fiscal 
resources for infrastructure projects, education, and other services necessary for residents. It is 
unlikely they were referring to building entertainment venues for the private sector. In fact, even 
the evolutionary theories such as club goods that discussed projects such as country clubs or local 
public goods still insufficiently describe the use of public finance for facilities. This would 
specifically cover the facility, but the facility and franchise are interrelated, therefore researchers 
sought to examine the production of public goods related to the franchise. However, when paying 
for the facility the city or state do not gain part ownership of the franchise, they merely “buy” the 
right to have the team remain in the city for a certain period. Therefore, the franchise that is a 
private good produces the public good and would provide the good with a privately financed 
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franchise similar to those produced by other privately owned and built sport facilities. In Figure 6, 
I point out that there is relevancy in public goods but from a more critical perspective that beckons 
the question if municipal capitalism and entrepreneurism should include investment in sport 
facilities.   
4.6 Discussion: Recent sport facility development and categorization 
In the past 20 years there were 68 franchises playing in new facilities (Table 2), including 16 Major 
League Baseball (MLB) franchises, 19 National Football League (NFL) and National Basketball 
Association (NBA) franchises, and 14 National Hockey League (NHL) franchises. Table 2 
displays the age of facilities used in each of the leagues in 2018. A few franchises share facilities, 
particularly NBA and NHL ones. There are new facilities currently being built for NFL and NBA 
franchises, and the MLS that is not included in Table 2. With so many relatively new facilities, it 
is not surprising that the public finance debate persists, particularly because the unlikelihood that 
franchises will stop pursuing public incentives as they have done since 1950s. Public officials have 
attempted to deter public finance such as the Eliminating Federal Tax Subsidies for Stadiums Act 
(S.1342) HR 811, but have failed thus far. 
 
Table 4-2: Stadium age in 2018 for each of the four leagues 
Stadium age MLB NFL NBA NHL Total 
1—5 1 3 3 3 10 
6—10 4 3 2 2 11 
11—15 4 2 2 2 10 
16—20 7 11 12 7 37 
21—50 9 9 9 16 43 
50+ 5 4 2 1 12 
Total 30 32 30 31 123 
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Table 3 outlines the eighteen facilities opened since 2010 for nineteen franchises. Public 
expenditure was close to six billion (2018) USD on the facilities themselves, not including other 
necessary investment and the land’s value.  
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Table 4-3: Financing, ownership, operations and estimated cost of Major League facilities opened since 2010 (Notes: Appendix 
2) 
Team(s) League Current name Capacity Opened 
Age of old 
facility/relocation/
expansion Owner Operator 
Estimated cost 
($ Millions 
when built) Financing 
Direct Public 
costs 
(Millions 
2018 USD) 
Notes ( 
Appendix) 
Atlanta Braves MLB SunTrust Park 41,084 2017 19 Public Braves 688.4 Mixed 377 1 
Atlanta Falcons NFL Mercedes-Benz 
Stadium 71,000 2017 24 
Public 
AMB 
(Falcons 
parent org) 
1,536.64 
Mixed 
204.9 2 
Brooklyn Nets NBA Barclays Center 17,732 2012 Relocated Public 
Brooklyn Nets 
(ArenaCo) 1,093.7 
Mixed 284.7 3 
Detroit Pistons NBA Little Caesars 
Arena 20,491 2017 28 Public 
Olympia 
Entertainment 883.98 
Mixed 332 4 
Detroit Red 
Wings 
NHL Little Caesars 
arena 19,515 2017 37 Public 
Olympia 
Entertainment 883.98 
Mixed 
332 4 
Edmonton 
Oilers 
NHL Rogers place 18,347 2016 41 Public 
Edmonton 
Oilers 381.88 
Mixed 277.3 5 
LA Rams / 
Chargers 
NFL Los Angeles 
Stadium at 
Hollywood Park 
70,240 2019 Relocated 
Private 
Los Angeles 
Rams 3,000 
Private 
0 6 
Las Vegas 
Raiders 
NFL Las Vegas stadium 65,000 2020 Relocated Public 
StadCo 
(Raiders) 1,439 
Mixed 750 7 
Miami Marlins MLB Marlins Park 36,742 2012 24 Public 
Miami 
Marlins 742.07 
Mixed 421.4 8 
Milwaukee 
Bucks 
NBA Fiserv Forum 17,500 2018 29 Public 
Milwaukee 
Bucks (ICON) 548.23 
Mixed 261.6 9 
Minnesota 
Twins 
MLB Target Field 38,544 2010 27 Public 
Minnesota 
Twins 639.12 
Mixed 403 10 
Minnesota 
Vikings 
NFL US Bank stadium 66,655 2016 33 Public 
Minnesota 
Vikings 1,234.79 
Mixed 544.7 11 
New York 
Giants/Jets 
NFL MetLife 82,500 2010 33 Private 
New York 
Giants 1,842.51 
Private 0 12 
New York 
Islanders 
NHL Barclays Center 15,795 2012 41 Public 
Brooklyn Nets 
(ArenaCo) 1,093.7 
Mixed 284.7 13 
Orlando Magic NBA Amway Center 18,846 2010 20 Public 
Orlando 
Magic 552.75 
Mixed 486.4 14 
Pittsburgh 
Penguins 
NHL PPG Paints Arena 18,387 2010 49 Public 
Pittsburgh 
Penguins 425.33 
Mixed 351.2 15 
Sacramento 
Kings 
NBA Golden 1 Center 17,583 2016 30 Public 
Kings 584.02 Mixed 266.8 16 
San Francisco 
49ers 
NFL Levi's stadium 
68,500 2014 42 
Public 
Santa Clara 
Stadium 
Authority 
1,497.04 
Mixed 
511.8 17 
Vegas Golden 
Knights 
NHL T-Mobile arena 17,368 2016 Expansion Private 
AEG 366.19 Private 0 18 
Sources: Various sources were used including public records, links to the sources can be provided upon request 
114 
 
Moving forward, I propose that researchers studying sport venue finance should focus on 
more adequate theories to investigate whether or not the public sector can still generate some 
benefits for the public sector while the professional leagues continue to operate as cartels. I propose 
a framework and flowchart (Figure 6) that firstly distinguishes each of the two theories, public 
goods and municipal capitalism, using similar criteria but from different perspectives. The next 
step in the proposed flowchart is to examine if the components in the actual project meet the criteria 
outlined in the theories. Finally, based on the previous step, I propose examining the outcome and 
how it reflects each of the theories and their criteria. 
Figure 4-6: Framework for Sport venue finance theoretical and project analysis 
 
     
 
The following examples, based on projects listed in Table 3, outline the proposed process 
of examination. The three examples are Detroit’s new arena, Las Vegas’s new stadium, and the 
new stadium in Inglewood, California (Table 4). In all three cases the facility itself is exclusionary 
and rivalrous because of the limited capacity and requirement to purchase tickets. This therefore 
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requires us to address the notion that produced public goods may have some beneficial merit to 
parts of the public. Detroit involved the movement of a franchise within the city while Las Vegas 
and Los Angeles involved franchises relocating to new cities that did not have a franchise from 
the same league. Los Angeles previously had NFL franchises but were without one since 1994, 
whereas this is the first NFL franchise to play in Las Vegas, and in fact only the second 
professional major league franchise to play in Las Vegas following the expansion of the NHL to 
Las Vegas in 2017. These three examples are also very different from one another. Detroit and Las 
Vegas both included public finance while Inglewood’s was ultimately privately financed. Detroit 
and Las Vegas had very different public financing resources to cover the public costs. Whereas 
they were both reliant on using publicly issued bonds, Detroit’s taxation was based on State issued 
bonds and downtown development. Las Vegas opted to increase hotel room taxes and therefore 
outsource costs to visiting tourists.  
Detroit’s original agreement with the franchise owners included privately property 
development nearby the arena in what they dubbed The District Detroit that would increase the 
city’s revenues and fund much needed redevelopment12. Since the arena’s completion, very few 
projects have been developed and there is no apparent contract that includes any compensation of 
other parts of the plan are not implemented. In the case of Las Vegas, public officials are hoping 
that the facility will attract more tourism to sporting and entertainment events that would otherwise 
not come to Las Vegas. Increased tourism will compensate for the public costs and “pay for itself” 
which will at the least resolve that part of the debate. It will not resolve the argument that increased 
hotel taxation could also be used for other public projects that are more likely local public goods 
                                                             
12 “The new 20,000 seat arena is the centerpiece of a 50-block area of the city dubbed The District Detroit that will 
include development of office space, retail, housing and hotels (http://www.degc.org/little-caesars-arena-
model-collaboration/) 
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such as education. Inglewood is very different, and the incentives were the right to have access to 
the Metropolitan Los Angeles market. But, the owner of one of the franchises that relocated to 
Inglewood also sought the possibility to build a state-of-art stadium and invest in mixed-use 
development nearby the stadium. Hence, in addition to the increased anticipated revenues from 
playing in Metropolitan Los Angeles, the owner is investing in real estate and reached an 
agreement to rent the facility to the other franchise that relocated to Metropolitan Los Angeles, 
automatically doubling the number of large sporting events during the NFLs regular season. The 
stadiums in Las Vegas and Inglewood are still under construction. Table 4 summarizes the three 
projects, examining the criteria described in Figure 6.  
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Table 4-4: Summary of the three examples 
 Detroit (Little Caesars 
Arena) 
Las Vegas (Allegiant 
Stadium) 
Los Angeles (SoFi Stadium) 
Primary 
objective 
A new arena in the Midtown 
area of Detroit and potential 
adjacent property 
development 
A new NFL stadium built for 
a relocated franchise 
New NFL stadium for 
relocated franchises and 
adjacent mixed-use property 
development 
Product Sport facility for preexisting 
franchise and nearby 
development  
Sport facility for a new 
franchise in the city 
Sport facility for relocated 
franchises and nearby 
development 
Who’s paying 
(public costs 
and “free 
riders”) 
State and city used tax-
exempt bonds to finance 
(Approximately 58% of the 
total cost). State funding 
relays some of the costs on to 
non-city sources.  
The public finance 
(Approximately 40% of the 
entire costs) relies on hotel 
room tax revenue and 
proceeds of bonds issued by 
Clark County. 
Privately financed facility 
but some tax-breaks are 
provided if revenues exceed 
a certain amount. 
Market 
conditions 
City recently filed for 
bankruptcy.  
Until recently had no 
franchise in a market 
dominated by tourism.  
City with no NFL franchise 
for several years despite the 
market’s size. 
Public or 
private 
City-owned but operated by 
private company 
City-owned but operated by 
private company 
Privately owned and 
operated 
Public goods The presence of a franchise 
may produce public goods 
but the facility itself is 
designed as a private product 
that is more likely the public 
provision of a private good 
and “market-failure” is a 
result of the monopoly rather 
than the unlikelihood that the 
private sector will provide 
the product. 
The presence of a franchise 
may produce public goods but 
the facility itself is designed 
as a private product that is 
more likely the public 
provision of a private good 
and “market-failure” is a 
result of the monopoly rather 
than the unlikelihood that the 
private sector will provide the 
product.  
This is a pure private good 
that is in fact producing the 
implied public goods such as 
pride and can therefore also 
be perceived as private 
provision of public goods. 
Municipal 
capitalism 
While the agreement relied 
on private property 
investments nearby the 
facility, they have been 
shortcoming raising 
questions as to the validity of 
the deal that potentially could 
be perceived as a relatively 
successful project given that 
cities continue to finance 
sport facilities 
A non-resident based cost 
burden (albeit that could be 
used for other projects) for a 
project hoped to attract more 
tourism and increase the city’s 
amenities that are not 
inherently based on gambling 
tourism. Success of this 
project depends on several 
factors that can only be 
estimated after the facility is 
completed. 
As a privately built facility, 
the city gained from rising 
property values and taxes 
without allocating costs, 
however, the city agreed to 
provide some tax breaks in 
order to assure the deal went 
through and these breaks are 
designed to cover the 
infrastructure costs.   
 
These three cases represent three distinct types of approaches to municipal capitalism that 
I believe emphasize the critical approach I discuss in this study. In Las Vegas, the use of an 
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exported tax that diverts benefits to non-payers contradicts principles of public finance that are 
closely tied to public goods ideas.  As a result there is no value in using public goods theory to 
assess the venue. Nevada made an investment in an effort to secure benefits (image) and possible 
new tax revenue growth for Clark County. From a municipal capitalism approach, the state 
legislature and representatives from Clark County wanted a strategic investment that fits with a 
municipal capitalism perspective. The return on the investment of dollars was an attempt to lure 
more events to Las Vegas while relaying the cost of the asset to tourists. Unless the additional 
taxes deter tourists which is unlikely or if tourists spend less money on other activities, the public 
sector has not risked its own capital. Nevada has ignored the benefit principle but in that sense is 
using “other people’s money” to secure tangible and intangible benefits for residents. The success 
of this agenda still depends on whether or not the events in the new stadium increase the number 
of tourists and generate new revenues. If that were to occur the public sector would have subsidized 
a facility without any return. (The hotel tax could not be used for any other asset other than those 
that enhance the hospitality sector).  
Detroit’s case is also better assessed from a municipal capitalism perspective. Detroit 
wanted to create an entertainment district that included all assets in a narrowly defined space. In 
exchange for a detailed development strategy led by Olympia Development the state and city 
agreed to commit TIF revenues to the building of a new venue for the Detroit Red Wings. The 
formal contract only called for $200 million in new real estate development, but the District Detroit 
plan which was extensively publicized described a far larger private sector commitment to 
redevelop the area in and around the entertainment district. The arena has been open for three 
years, and very little of the promised development has taken place even though the terms of the 
contract between Olympia Development and the public sector have been fulfilled. Simply put, the 
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project’s larger objectives have not been met and the contract between the city and the owner failed 
to guarantee much of the development detailed development. There was never an intent to declare 
the venue a public good; the public sector made an investment in a plan, District Detroit, but lacks 
the legal recourse to secure its anticipated return. 
The Inglewood project is possibly the best example of a successful municipal capitalism 
venture, the collaboration between the public and private sector resulted in a privately financed 
project that includes substantial development. The owner of the St. Louis Rams wanted to relocate 
to the Los Angeles area. To that end, a partnership was formed that purchased a horse racing track 
and surrounding land in Inglewood, California. With all of the risk for the investment assumed by 
the private sector, the public sector’s liability is for a tax abatement if development exceeds an 
agreed to level. That contract assured the public sector that for permitting the stadium to be built, 
new tax revenues will be secured. As a result, the venue was not considered a public good and the 
dimensions of the contract make it clear that the venue is a private good. The private sector assumes 
the majority of the risks. The only potential loss for the city is from other developments that could 
have otherwise been built on the large parcel land that was bought by the team’s owner13.  
4.7 Conclusions: Where to next 
During the extensive stadium finance research in the 1990s and early 2000s, researchers appeared 
to reach a consensus that the North American professional sport leagues curtailed competition and 
used these circumstances to leverage public incentives and finance for new sport venues. However, 
public officials continue to provide incentives despite the monopolized structure of the leagues in 
                                                             
13 “This is a really good deal [from a public-policy standpoint] compared to virtually any football stadium that has 
been built in the last 30 years,” Noll said, adding a caveat about potential lost revenue from developments that might 
otherwise have been constructed on the 298-acre site. (“The Rams’ $5 billion stadium complex is bigger than 
Disneyland. It might be perfect for L.A.” Washington Post, January 26th, 2019) 
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their pursuit of attracting or maintaining a major league franchise. There appear to be two leading 
arguments for such investments: 
1. The economic impact arguments often made by stadium finance proponents that economic 
impact studies identified that, bar a few exceptions, actual development and economic 
development is inconsistent with the initial arguments. 
2. Perceived cultural amenities such as civic price and identity that supposedly appeal to new 
and existing citizens. Public incentives and costs are a necessary means to guarantee the 
presence of a franchise that provides these social amenities. 
The intangible social benefits are hard to quantify and there is no evidence yet to support 
arguments that enough people moved to or left a location because of the presence or lack thereof 
of a sport franchise that justifies public finance. Nor is there evidence that people left a city that 
publicly supported the incentives or costs for a facility to suggest that publicly financed facilities 
negatively affected the local economy. Academics have examined some neoclassical public 
finance theories in relation to sport facilities, particularly referring to public goods. The majority 
of these studies examined the produced public goods and social amenities such as civic pride that 
are generally un-contested and un-restrictive. However, while some produced goods may be public 
ones, the sport facilities are in essence private goods and so are the franchises that play in them. 
Additionally, in cases where the private sector privately builds the facilities then the social 
amenities will become privately provisioned public goods and in fact do not require public 
investment. These arguments are well known but the public sector continues to contribute public 
capital and space to privately owned sport franchises.  
I argue that public goods provide some necessary feedback but fail to address the actual 
reasons why cities have not collectively refused to provide incentives as long as the monopolies 
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persist. It is more likely that the costs to maintain or attract a franchise stem from entrepreneurial 
or personal agendas rather than the provision of (local) public goods. Therefore, I propose that 
future analysis of stadium finance should focus on municipal capitalism and urban 
entrepreneurialism rather than examine these projects from a neoclassical public finance 
theoretical approach. Albeit, the neoclassical studies are an important criticism of the potential 
misuse of public resources that could otherwise serve a larger portion of the population or provide 
necessary services that are more likely local public goods. However, municipal capitalism and 
urban entrepreneurialism theorists indicated that during the 1980s and 1990s many cities expanded 
their role from resource providers to business and development entrepreneurs competing for 
human capital. Sport franchises and their costly facilities may just be a part of this agenda in some 
cases. The sport cartels undoubtedly affect the decision-making process but cities do not have to 
pay if they are willing to lose a franchise or “call the bluff”. This raises a number of questions and 
ultimately what I argue academics should further examine in the literature: 
1. Would there be some justification in financing or providing incentives for sport 
facilities if the public consented in a democratic process if there were no monopoly?   
2. Would the response be different if public officials ceased to make claims that the 
facility will have explicit economic benefits that justify costs and just focus on the 
proposed intangible benefits such as civic pride? 
Ultimately, considering that cities invest in different amenities and compete over human capital 
3. Is sport a perceived amenity that contributes to a city’s identity and part of a larger 
social “package” appealing to human capital and investors? 
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4. Do the monopolies force cities to contribute resources that cities would not provide if 
the monopolies did not exist or do the monopolies ultimately distort the scale of the 
costs of having a franchise? 
5. Is the ultimate question then; how much should the public pay for this product if the 
monopoly did not exist? Is there a justified cost and how should it be assessed? 
It is possible that these expenses and public incentives are not justified under any circumstances, 
but these dilemmas are not limited to the sport industry. Since the late 1980s, academics debated 
the justifications for public expenses that extend beyond the neoclassical public goods and public 
finance theories. Municipal capitalism and urban entrepreneurialism may provide a better 
explanation why cities engage in these activities but they do not necessarily justify the investments. 
By examining these theoretical perspectives, academics can provide a more lucid explanation as 
to why public officials engage in these activities, provide new critiques examining the outcomes, 
and assess when and how much costs are justified.   
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4.9 Appendix 
Table 4-5: Appendix 1: List of studies included in the analysis and cited in the reference list 
Author (s) Year General topic  Analysis  Analysis type Study unit  
Ahlfeldt, & Maennig, 2010 Economic impact Real Estate Quantitative Europe 
Ahlfeldt, & Maennig, 2012 Willingness to pay and voting Voting Quantitative Europe 
Ahlfeldt, & Maennig 2010 Social and welfare Regional and local impact Quantitative Europe 
Austrian, & Rosentraub 2002 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Baade 2003 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Baade.  1996 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Baade & Dye  1988 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Baade & Dye.  1990 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Baade & Dye F.  1988 Financing Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Baade, & Matheson 2006 Financing Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Baade, & Matheson 2001 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Baade, & Tiehen 1990 Attendace Attendance Quantitative North America 
Baade, Baumann, & Matheson 2011 Economic impact Tax change Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Baade, Baumann, & Matheson 2008 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Baade, Baumann, & Matheson 2008 Economic impact Tax change Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Bale 1990 Social and welfare Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative Europe 
Buist, & Mason,  2010 Financing Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Carlino, & Coulson 2004 Social and welfare Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Chanayil 2002 Economic impact Descriptive  North America - Case Studies 
Chapin 2004 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Coates 2007 Economic impact Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America 
Coates & Humphreys 2003 Willingness to pay and voting Voting Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Coates & Humphreys 2008 Economic impact Academic paper analysis Qualitative North America 
Coates & Humphreys 2000 Financing Academic paper analysis Qualitative Theoretical 
Coates & Humphreys 2003 Financing Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Coates & Humphreys 2002 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative  
Coates & Humphreys 2006 Willingness to pay and voting Voting Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Coates & Humphreys 2005 Attendance Attendance Quantitative North America 
Coates, Humphreys, & Zimbalist 2006 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Collins 2008 Governance Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Collins, & Grineski.  2007 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Crompton 2004 Financing Academic paper analysis Qualitative Theoretical 
Crompton. 2006 Economic impact Academic paper analysis Qualitative North America 
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Author (s) Year General topic  Analysis  Analysis type Study unit  
Crompton  1995 Economic impact Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America 
Crompton, Howard, & Var  2003 Governance Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Dehring, Depken II, & Ward 2008 Willingness to pay and voting Voting Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Dehring,, Depken, & Ward  2007 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Delaney, & Eckstein 2007 Governance Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Delaney, & Eckstein  2003 Governance Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Dietl, Lang,& Nesseler 2017 Financing Theoretical Theoretical Theoretical 
Erickson 2001 Antitrust and law Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Feng, & Humphreys 2018 Economic impact Real Estate Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Fort 2004 Financing Sport economics, ticket sales Quantitative North America 
Fort 1998 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America 
Fox 2005 Financing Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Friedman, & Mason 2004 Governance Academic paper analysis Qualitative North America 
Friedman, & Mason  2005 Governance Stakeholder analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Gitter, & Rhoads 2014 Attendace Attendance Quantitative North America 
Grant Long, 2005 Financing Financial estimates Quantitative North America 
Gratton, Shibli, & Coleman 2005 Economic impact Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative Europe 
Groothuis, & Rotthoff  2016 Social and welfare Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America 
Groothuis, Johnson, & 
Whitehead 2004 Social and welfare CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Hefner 1990 Economic impact Financial estimates Quantitative North America 
Horn, Cantor, & Fort 2015 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Hudson 2003 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Humphreys & Zhou. 2015 Economic impact Theoretical Theoretical North America 
Hutchinson, Berg, & Kellison 2018 Governance Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Irani 1997 Attendance Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Jensen. 1999 Antitrust and law Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America 
Johnson, Groothuis, & 
Whitehead 2001 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Johnson, Mondello, & 
Whitehead 2007 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Johnson, Whitehead, Mason, & 
Walker  2012 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Johnson & Hall.  2019 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Jones 2002 Financing   Europe 
Jones 2002 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative Europe 
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Author (s) Year General topic  Analysis  Analysis type Study unit  
Kalich 1998 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Kellison, & Mondello. 2014 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Kellison, Newman, & Bunds  2017 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Kennedy & Rosentraub 2000 Financing Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Lee 2002 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Lertwachara & Cochran 2007 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Lipsitz 1984 Financing Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Mahony, & Howard 2001 Financing Sport economics, ticket sales Quantitative North America 
Mason, & Buist  2013 Governance Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Mason, Buist, Edwards, & 
Duquette.  2007 Financing  Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Mason, Sant, & Misener 2018 Economic impact Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Matheson, & Humphreys 2009 Antitrust and law Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Miller 2002 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Mills, Rosentraub, Winfree, & 
Cantor.  2014 Financing Tax change Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Mules  1998 Financing Descriptive Qualitative Other 
Nelson. 2002 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Nelson. 2001 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Owen 2006 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Owen 2003 Social and welfare Theoretical Theoretical Theoretical 
Phelps  2003 Financing Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America 
Poitras, & Hadley  2006 Financing Sport economics, ticket sales Quantitative North America 
Porter, & Thomas  2010 
Willingness to pay and voting 
CVM Quantitative North America 
Preuss 2004 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative Europe 
Propheter 2017 Economic impact Real Estate Quantitative North America 
Propheter 2012 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Rappaport, & Wilkerson 2001 Social and welfare Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Rosentraub 2006 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Rosentraub 1999 Antitrust and law Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Rosentraub, & Swindell 2002 Governance Descriptive Qualitative North America 
Rosentraub, & Swindell 1991 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Rosentraub., Swindell, 
Przybylski,  & Mullins 1994 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Ross 2003 Antitrust and law Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Saito  2018 Governance Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
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Author (s) Year General topic  Analysis  Analysis type Study unit  
Sam, & Scherer 2008 Financing Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative Other 
Sant, & Mason  2019 Financing Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Santo 2005 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Santo 2007 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Scherer, & Sam 2008 Governance Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative Other 
Schwester  2007 Willingness to pay and voting Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Searle 2002 Financing Descriptive Qualitative Mega events 
Siegfried, & Zimbalist  2000 Economic impact Academic paper analysis Qualitative North America 
Siegfried, & Zimbalist  2006 Economic impact Academic paper analysis Qualitative North America 
Siegfried, & Zimbalist  2002 Economic impact Regional and local impact Quantitative North America 
Swindell, & Rosentraub,   1998 Economic impact Interviews, surveys, document analysis Qualitative North America - Case Studies 
Tu, 2005 Economic impact Real Estate Quantitative North America - Case Studies 
Walker, & Mondello 2007 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative North America 
Wilson, & Pomfret 2009 Financing Descriptive Qualitative Other 
Zimbalist, & Noll 1997 Economic impact Academic paper analysis Qualitative North America 
Spilling 1998 Economic impact Descriptive Qualitative Mega events 
Walton, Longo, & Dawson 2008 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative Europe 
Castellanos, García, & Sánchez  2011 Willingness to pay and voting CVM Quantitative Europe 
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Table 4-6: Appendix 2: Notes and links for Table 4. 
Notes  
1 Moved from Atlanta to nearby Cobb county following  a financing agreement with substantial public financing   
2 Substantial private investment but also includes accruing hotel tax for future development (estimated at 
700,000,000 total) 
 
3 Public financing included direct contributions and used eminent domain for use of the property that included 
planned development around the arena  
 
4 $324,100,000 for the facility itself (the arena cost 862,900,000 + 259,000,000 for other development) the city also 
provided $34,000,000 for a practice facility for the Pistons for relocation purposes. Ice Hockey reduced capacity in 
the front rows. 
 
5 The city directly financed part of the arena and development nearby, as stated no taxes were raised but ticket 
surcharges were implemented 
 
6 Financing the facility was a private venture but the city included a sales tax break to "compensate" for infrastructure 
development. The stadium is owned by the LA Rams 
 
7 Public finances are based on increased hotel taxes, final cost of the facility is not yet determined   
8 Substantial public financing and additional expenses on parking lots nearby, the financing mechanism has been 
heavily scrutinized and was also subject to a law suit against the team 
 
9 The State (through WCD) provided at least $203,000,000 (bond sales) and the city was required to include 
investment in parking structures 
 
10 Funds are generated through a 0.15% sales tax, of the $350,000,000 $260,000,000 were the ballpark itself  
11 Public finance through charitable gambling (State)   
12 The building was erected on state-owned land at the 750-acre New Jersey sports complex, and the Jets and the 
Giants got 20 acres each for training facilities, as well as the right to develop 75 acres. Stadium is owned by NY 
Giants 
 
13 New York Islanders moved to Brooklyn following a failed referendum to publicly finance a new facility  
14 Public finance based on hotel taxes and sale and development of old arena  
15 Direct cost through revenue bond issuing backed from various sources including casinos, the team in addition to 
minimal financial contribution received operational and revenues rights on nearby parking garage 
 
16 Public finance using taxable lease-revenue bonds, “The repayment sources include ESC lease payments, parking net 
revenue, hotel taxes, and revenues generated by the development of the ESC". The deal also gave the city the right 
to host several events at the arena each year.  
 
17 The public costs are loans rather than direct costs, but the loans are returned through naming rights agreements and 
other revenues sources  
 
18 Arena was privately financed   
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 Conclusions 
5.1 General conclusions 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to study the economics of stadium investment and 
development, and broaden the current literature. Each of my three studies provide new insights 
related to existing literature, confirm previously proposed arguments, and propose new methods 
to examine the finances of professional sport venues. Based on the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses in my research, I conclude and corroborate the evidence that the monopolistic structure 
of North American professional sport significantly affects where franchises are located and creates 
the market-failure that empowers the private sector pursuing public incentives. It is apparent that 
markets that appeared to be economically and demographically robust enough to have franchises 
did not have franchises playing in them. Leagues explicitly prevent franchise owners from 
relocating independently to different markets. Such markets without franchises can, and have been 
used as leverage by franchise owners to obtain public incentives. Because of the monopolies, it 
also appears that the long-term effect of new facilities on attendance and economic activity is also 
shorter compared to English soccer, that includes promotion and relegation. The duration of the 
association between the new stadiums and attendance was significantly longer in English soccer 
than the “honeymoon” in North American sports. As I revealed in the third study in the dissertation, 
despite the criticism against the allocation of public resources and incentives, since 2010 the public 
sector provided over five billion USD to support the development of professional sport venues. 
Public incentives and finance is unlikely to change, therefore I propose that the analysis of sport 
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related projects should focus on more recent urban development and governance theories as 
opposed to neoclassical public finance ones.  
Mounting pressure on local governments to provide services and invest in infrastructure 
weighs on many cities struggling with growing population and demand for local amenities (Reese 
& Li, 2019). In some instances, cities such as Detroit were heavily affected by global shifts during 
the postindustrial era and more recently by the 2008 financial crisis. Some of those cities are 
struggling to rejuvenate their local economy and lack the resources to invest in necessary 
infrastructure (Kasdan, 2015). The increasing fiscal stress on local authorities requires adequate 
responses by public officials and decision-making concerning the proper use of public resources 
and local investments in development projects (Elling, Krawczyk & Carr, 2014). According to 
several studies, investment in professional sport facilities is not a justifiable investment and in fact, 
continuously strains local governments several years after the facilities are built (Grant-Long, 
2013). There is some merit to these investments when the right circumstances and public-private 
agreements exist that could shift economic activity in conjunction with redevelopment initiatives 
(Rosentraub, 2014). In cases where the public and private sector failed to utilize initial agreements 
the investments essentially become subsidies and public provisions of private goods. This 
unfortunately appears to be the case for several cities. Such cities provided public resources for 
private facilities without a sufficient tangible return on their investment. The theoretical 
backgrounds and contributions of my three studies include an economic geography perspective, 
an analysis of attendance economics and new sport venues, and an elaborate discussion on public 
finance and policy. I address each of these separately in the following section. 
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5.2 Specific conclusions 
North American professional leagues have a stronghold on the sport industry, and their 
monopolistic status limits the number of franchises. The monopolies enable franchises to use 
relocation threats in their pursuit to capture public incentives for new sport venues. Potential 
alternative markets must exist to make relocation a credible threat. Previous studies examined this 
in various ways and proposed that potential markets without franchises exist. My spatial analysis 
of Metropolitan Statistical Areas and counties in the United States, covering five census periods 
(1970-2010), proves that this was a systemic longitudinal process. The NFL for instance explicitly 
state that franchise owners are not free to relocate their franchises, while franchise owners in other 
leagues were also explicitly prevented from relocating to new markets. There are two implications 
to the current circumstances that suggest that the geography of North American professional sport 
would look very different if it the leagues were monopolized. Firstly, dismantling the monopolies 
will weaken the leagues’ and franchises power dynamics when bargaining for public incentives. 
Secondly, it is possible that franchises would leave certain markets that suffered from economic 
decline since the 1950s, particularly affecting the presence of professional sport in Midwest cities 
that have strong social ties with their markets. There may however be some social merits in a 
system that prevents all the franchises concentrating in the largest markets. However, the public 
sector has been paying a substantial amount of capital to sustain this. Furthermore, there is likely 
an agenda within the leagues to maintain the current geographical distribution. The shared-revenue 
systems that lessen the dependency franchises have on local markets arguably reflects these 
interests to maintain a certain status quo and presence in certain parts of North America.   
 It does appear though that the monopolistic structure has another substantial impact on 
professional sport and new sport venues. Proponents pursuing public incentives or positive voting 
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outcomes have long argued that new facilities induce economic activity. Among these arguments 
for public incentives are the claims that increased attendance in new venues induces pedestrian 
activity around the facility. Since public officials spread financing and public incentives over 
several years, the relationship between the facility and increased attendance should also be a long-
term one to justify such claims. Several studies in North America refute this claim, as they identify 
a limited duration where the association between the new facility and increased attendance is 
statistically significant, primarily less than ten years. This however is not the case in English 
soccer. In English soccer, the association between increased attendance and new sport venues is 
more prevalent. Extending well over ten years, the “honeymoon” is far longer in English soccer. 
There are several differences between the North American and European leagues, but among the 
greatest differences is the closed structure of North American leagues and the promotion-
relegation system in Europe. I do not determine that the cause for this is the fact that English soccer 
has promotion and relegation, but it does indicate there is a difference in the outcome that the 
different league structure can potentially explain. This merely indicates another possible effect of 
the North American professional sport monopolies have on stadium finance. The possible 
association between the monopoly and “honeymoon” effect arguably hinders the argument that 
increased economic activity associated with larger attendance compensates for the costs. I discuss 
the likelier assurance of a positive effect in my third study.  
 The responsibilities of public officials evolved since the latter parts of the 20th century to 
include agendas pursuing prosperity and innovation to cities in addition to allocating fundamental 
public resources. Increasing competition for human capital often requires public officials to adopt 
entrepreneurial agendas and governance. Generally, this is not a novel concept that public officials 
have other agendas other than providing services. Local governments have long sought to attract 
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revenue-yielding investments. However, their role would focus on regulatory processes in 
conjunction with private investment. Since the 1980s, the entrepreneurial public sector transpired, 
actively pursuing development through public-private partnerships, and public investment in 
private sector like projects. I believe that these changes reflect the need to study stadium finance 
from an urban entrepreneurial perspective rather than neoclassical economic ones.  
  Examining stadium finance from a different perspective is not an attempt to justify the use 
of public resources for privately operated sport venues, but rather suggests a means to understand 
why despite all the criticism and existing analyses, cities continue to provide incentives and 
resources for these venues. There are still political and personal agendas but it is more likely that 
decision-makers have an entrepreneurial agenda as opposed to a public goods one. Previous studies 
examined the expenditure with neoclassical perspectives, but as Baade and Matheson (2006) 
suggest, sport venue related projects require a broader public finance perspective.  
One of these perspectives in urban studies implies that decision-makers no longer address 
public investment in the same manner that neoclassical theories such as public goods do. Public 
sector decision-making is more similar to the private sector and public officials operate with 
business-mind agendas and strategic management. The agendas focus on encouraging private 
investment but also include public investment in urban projects. Sport venues, and more accurately 
the franchises playing in them, are an amenity that appeals to some people, and given the right 
conditions, sport venues could shift economic activity within the city to strategic locations and 
potentially encourage private investment. Unfortunately, that is not often the case. Negotiation 
processes often fail to guarantee private investment or compensation in cases of inadequate private 
investment. Public officials occasionally face the prospect of losing a franchise and the perception 
that losing a franchise can harm them politically. Therefore, public officials are inclined to 
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facilitate the franchise’s demands. Either way, it is unlikely that public officials provide these 
incentives and resources on the basis that they are public goods or even club goods. It is more 
likely a public provision of a private good, and as long as franchises can relocate without 
replacement, public officials and the general population are often confronted with the difficult 
decision of allocation public resources or potentially losing the franchise. Bar, any policy or law 
changes, or collusion among local public sectors to cease any public resources devoted to sport 
venues, it is merely the case of making the most of the situation and create public benefits that 
could compensate for the expenditure. For policy makers, this would include requiring the private 
sector to compensate for goals that the private sector failed to meet, but that again is unlikely, 
given the monopolized structure of North American sport.  
5.3 Future research 
The three studies provide a basis for several new studies in sport and sport venue economics and 
public policy. The assumption that some markets exist without franchises despite their 
characteristics similar to those with franchises should be further established by examining the 
optimal geographical allocation of sport franchises given the current conditions. Another follow-
up study though should also examine the optimal number of franchises and their location if the 
monopolies did not exist. Additionally, a longitudinal analysis of a shorter period but continuous 
timeline could provide further evidence of the impact of the monopolies on the spatial distribution 
of franchises given other data that is not consistently available or reliable in the census data. Such 
studies can provide further evidence on the impact of variables such as firms and other economic 
characteristics on the location of sport franchises. Establishing the hypothesis that league structure 
impacts the duration of the statistical association between new venues and attendance should be 
further examined in other leagues with promotion and relegation. A mixed-methods study can also 
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elaborate on the impact and incentives to build new privately financed sport venues in leagues with 
promotion and relegation as opposed to the North American models. Based on the final study, I 
propose four seemingly important studies that have not received enough attention. Firstly, I 
propose that a study is required that elaborates on the conditions that led to the allocation of public 
incentives and finance. This includes examining whether or not there were relocation threats and 
who initiated the project? Secondly, future studies should focus on the urban planning perspective, 
particularly performance and conformance, and the implementation of urban plans that included 
large sport venues. Thirdly, additional statistical analysis of the local distribution of economic 
activity and policy agendas can elaborate on the extent cities can “make the most” of the situation 
and use sport as a platform to redistribute economic activity within the city. Finally, I propose that 
to provide a comparative perspective, studies should examine cities and districts where sport venue 
projects were not developed and what happened in the areas of the proposed sites.    
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